Files
verdande/internal/httpapi/server.go
T
Kristian WindandClaude Opus 5 c2e2d66e76
Release / Build and publish image (push) Failing after 12m56s
feat(admin): keep server errors where a restart cannot take them
The panel's watcher reported four 5xx today — twice from one address at
11:49, twice from another at 10:45 — and there is no way to find out what
any of them were. verdande logs the real cause of every 500, but on a Rune
the log belongs to the container and the container is replaced on every
restart. So an operator is told that something broke and given nothing to
act on, which is the worst of both: alarming and useless.

Every 500 now writes a row: what the handler was attempting in its own
words, the error it hit, the method and path, who was asking, and the
request id that ties it back to the log line for whoever still has it. The
"what" is the part a status code cannot give — "list projects" and "move
task" are the difference between a fault you can find and one you can only
count.

Written best-effort and never checked. This is the path that is already
reporting a failure, and a diagnostic that can itself fail the request
would turn one broken screen into two.

Threading the request through `internal()` and `storeError()` touched 108
call sites across 19 files, which is the price of not having had it there
from the start. It is mechanical and the compiler checked all of it.

Kept for thirty days by the nightly sweep: long enough to answer "what
happened last week", short enough that a fault loop cannot fill the volume
the tasks live on.

Read at Indstillinger → Fejl, administrators only — it carries paths,
account names and the server's own error strings. The empty state says
"Ingen fejl registreret. Det er den rigtige tilstand", because a blank
panel should not read as a broken one.

The test drops a table and asks for the endpoint that reads it: the same
code path a disk error takes, and the row that comes back has to name the
operation, the account and the request.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-17 22:58:02 +02:00

533 lines
19 KiB
Go

// Package httpapi wires verdande's HTTP surface: the REST API under /api/v1, the
// WebSocket endpoint, and the static PWA that the same binary serves.
package httpapi
import (
"encoding/json"
"errors"
"io/fs"
"log/slog"
"net/http"
"os"
"path"
"strings"
"time"
"github.com/go-chi/chi/v5"
"github.com/go-chi/chi/v5/middleware"
"github.com/kristianwind/verdande/internal/config"
"github.com/kristianwind/verdande/internal/mail"
"github.com/kristianwind/verdande/internal/mcp"
"github.com/kristianwind/verdande/internal/realtime"
"github.com/kristianwind/verdande/internal/store"
"github.com/kristianwind/verdande/internal/update"
)
// Version is stamped by main at build time, and is what the update check compares
// against. A package-level variable rather than a config field because it is a
// property of the binary, not of how it was configured.
var Version = "dev"
type Server struct {
cfg *config.Config
db *store.DB
log *slog.Logger
web fs.FS
mail *mail.Sender
hub *realtime.Hub
mcp *mcp.Server
updates *update.Checker
// Password guessing is the attack this application is actually exposed to, so
// the endpoints that check a secret are limited separately and more tightly
// than the rest of the API.
loginLimiter *limiter
resetLimiter *limiter
// Computed once from the built index.html; see csp.go.
csp string
router chi.Router
}
// New builds the router. `web` is the built SvelteKit app, embedded into the binary
// at build time; a nil value serves an explanatory placeholder instead so that a
// backend-only build still runs and reports its health.
func New(cfg *config.Config, db *store.DB, log *slog.Logger, web fs.FS) *Server {
s := &Server{
cfg: cfg, db: db, log: log, web: web,
mail: mail.New(cfg.SMTP, cfg.BaseURL, log),
hub: realtime.NewHub(log),
loginLimiter: newLimiter(10, 15*time.Minute),
resetLimiter: newLimiter(5, time.Hour),
}
s.csp = contentSecurityPolicy(scriptHashes(web))
s.mcp = s.buildMCP()
s.updates = update.New(Version, cfg.UpdateCheck)
r := chi.NewRouter()
r.Use(middleware.RequestID)
r.Use(middleware.RealIP)
r.Use(requestLogger(log))
r.Use(middleware.Recoverer)
r.Use(middleware.Timeout(30 * time.Second))
r.Use(s.securityHeaders)
// Unauthenticated, and deliberately outside /api/v1: the Rune healthcheck and
// Docker both need this to answer before anyone has logged in.
r.Get("/healthz", s.handleHealth)
// The calendar feed is outside /api/v1 and outside the session: a calendar
// client cannot log in, so the token in the path is the whole credential.
r.Get("/ics/{token}", s.handleICSFeed)
// CalDAV, outside /api/v1 because clients do well-known-path discovery
// against the root and authenticate with Basic rather than a session.
r.Get("/.well-known/caldav", s.wellKnownCalDAV)
// Inbound mail. Delivered by the mail server rather than by a browser, and
// authenticated by the token in the recipient address.
r.Post("/inbound/mail", s.handleInboundMail)
// MCP with the token in the query string, for clients that cannot send a
// header. Claude's custom-connector dialog takes a URL and nothing else, so
// /api/v1/mcp — which wants Authorization: Bearer — cannot be configured from
// it at all. Same reasoning as the calendar feed above: a client that cannot
// be told to send a header means the token in the URL is the credential.
//
// Outside /api/v1 deliberately, because it must not be reachable with a
// session cookie. A cookie-authenticated POST with no CSRF check is a
// cross-site request waiting to happen; handleMCPWithKey accepts the key and
// nothing else.
r.Post("/mcp", s.handleMCPWithKey)
// Google sends the browser here after consent. Outside /api/v1 because it is a
// top-level navigation rather than a fetch, but still behind the session — the
// tokens it exchanges belong to whoever is signed in.
r.Group(func(r chi.Router) {
r.Use(s.requireAuth)
r.Get("/oauth/gmail/callback", s.handleGmailCallback)
})
r.Route("/caldav", s.caldavRoutes)
r.Route("/api/v1", func(r chi.Router) {
r.Use(s.requireCSRF)
r.Get("/ping", func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, map[string]string{"status": "ok"})
})
// Reachable without being signed in — these are how you become signed in.
r.Route("/auth", func(r chi.Router) {
r.Get("/setup", s.handleSetupState)
r.Method(http.MethodPost, "/setup",
s.rateLimit(s.loginLimiter, http.HandlerFunc(s.handleBootstrap)))
r.Method(http.MethodPost, "/login",
s.rateLimit(s.loginLimiter, http.HandlerFunc(s.handleLogin)))
r.Method(http.MethodPost, "/signup",
s.rateLimit(s.loginLimiter, http.HandlerFunc(s.handleSignup)))
r.Method(http.MethodPost, "/password/forgot",
s.rateLimit(s.resetLimiter, http.HandlerFunc(s.handleForgotPassword)))
r.Method(http.MethodPost, "/password/reset",
s.rateLimit(s.resetLimiter, http.HandlerFunc(s.handleResetPassword)))
// The second step of a login: a session that has passed the password
// but not yet the code, and can reach nothing else.
r.Group(func(r chi.Router) {
r.Use(s.requirePendingSession)
r.Method(http.MethodPost, "/login/totp",
s.rateLimit(s.loginLimiter, http.HandlerFunc(s.handleLoginTOTP)))
})
r.Group(func(r chi.Router) {
r.Use(s.requireAuth)
r.Get("/me", s.handleMe)
r.Patch("/me", s.handleUpdateProfile)
r.Post("/logout", s.handleLogout)
r.Post("/password/change", s.handleChangePassword)
r.Post("/totp/setup", s.handleTOTPSetup)
r.Post("/totp/confirm", s.handleTOTPConfirm)
r.Post("/totp/disable", s.handleTOTPDisable)
r.Get("/recovery-codes", s.handleRecoveryCodesCount)
r.Post("/recovery-codes", s.handleRecoveryCodesRegenerate)
// Behind requireSession, like the API tokens and for the same
// reason: a leaked token must not be able to end the sessions of
// the person it was stolen from, or list their devices.
r.Group(func(r chi.Router) {
r.Use(s.requireSession)
r.Get("/sessions", s.handleListSessions)
r.Delete("/sessions/{sessionID}", s.handleDeleteSession)
})
})
})
// Everything past this point needs a complete login.
r.Group(func(r chi.Router) {
r.Use(s.requireAuth)
r.Get("/ws", s.handleWebSocket)
// The MCP endpoint. Reachable with a personal API token, so a connector
// sees exactly what its owner sees.
r.Post("/mcp", s.handleMCP)
r.Get("/today", s.handleToday)
r.Get("/filters/preview", s.handlePreviewFilter)
r.Route("/filters", func(r chi.Router) {
r.Get("/", s.handleListFilters)
r.Post("/", s.handleCreateFilter)
r.Get("/{filterID}/tasks", s.handleRunFilter)
r.Patch("/{filterID}", s.handleUpdateFilter)
r.Delete("/{filterID}", s.handleDeleteFilter)
})
r.Get("/feed", s.handleGetFeed)
r.Route("/notifications", func(r chi.Router) {
r.Get("/", s.handleListNotifications)
r.Post("/read", s.handleMarkNotificationsRead)
r.Post("/{notificationID}/read", s.handleMarkNotificationsRead)
})
r.Route("/push", func(r chi.Router) {
r.Get("/key", s.handlePushKey)
r.Post("/subscribe", s.handleSubscribePush)
r.Post("/unsubscribe", s.handleUnsubscribePush)
})
r.Route("/attachments/{attachmentID}", func(r chi.Router) {
r.Get("/", s.handleDownloadAttachment)
r.Delete("/", s.handleDeleteAttachment)
})
r.Route("/comments/{commentID}", func(r chi.Router) {
r.Patch("/", s.handleUpdateComment)
r.Delete("/", s.handleDeleteComment)
})
r.Post("/feed/rotate", s.handleRotateFeed)
r.Get("/mail-address", s.handleGetMailAddress)
r.Post("/mail-address/rotate", s.handleRotateMailAddress)
// Personal API tokens. Behind requireSession rather than the ambient
// auth: a token must not be able to mint or revoke another.
r.Route("/tokens", func(r chi.Router) {
r.Use(s.requireSession)
r.Get("/", s.handleListAPITokens)
r.Post("/", s.handleCreateAPIToken)
r.Delete("/{tokenID}", s.handleDeleteAPIToken)
})
r.Route("/ai", func(r chi.Router) {
r.Get("/settings", s.handleGetAISettings)
r.Put("/settings", s.handleSetAISettings)
r.Post("/summary", s.handleAISummary)
r.Post("/tasks/{taskID}/split", s.handleAISplit)
})
r.Get("/version", s.handleVersion)
r.Route("/gmail", func(r chi.Router) {
r.Get("/", s.handleGetGmail)
r.Put("/", s.handleSetGmail)
r.Delete("/", s.handleDisconnectGmail)
r.Post("/authorize", s.handleGmailAuthorize)
r.Post("/sync", s.handleGmailSyncNow)
})
r.Route("/import", func(r chi.Router) {
r.Post("/todoist", s.handleImportTodoist)
r.Post("/csv", s.handleImportCSV)
})
r.Get("/export/account", s.handleExportAccount)
r.Get("/export/projects/{projectID}.csv", s.handleExportProject)
r.Get("/export/projects/{projectID}.ics", s.handleExportProjectICS)
r.Route("/templates", func(r chi.Router) {
r.Get("/", s.handleListTemplates)
r.Post("/", s.handleSaveTemplate)
r.Post("/{templateID}/use", s.handleUseTemplate)
r.Delete("/{templateID}", s.handleDeleteTemplate)
})
r.Delete("/reminders/{reminderID}", s.handleDeleteReminder)
r.Route("/labels", func(r chi.Router) {
r.Get("/", s.handleListLabels)
r.Post("/", s.handleCreateLabel)
r.Patch("/{labelID}", s.handleUpdateLabel)
r.Delete("/{labelID}", s.handleDeleteLabel)
})
r.Get("/upcoming", s.handleUpcoming)
r.Get("/delegated", s.handleDelegated)
r.Get("/people", s.handlePeople)
r.Get("/search", s.handleSearch)
r.Route("/projects", func(r chi.Router) {
r.Get("/", s.handleListProjects)
r.Post("/", s.handleCreateProject)
// Above /{projectID}, or chi reads "reorder" as an id.
r.Post("/reorder", s.handleReorderProjects)
r.Route("/{projectID}", func(r chi.Router) {
// Read access is the floor for the whole subtree; the writes
// below tighten it to editor or owner individually.
r.Use(s.requireProject(store.RoleViewer))
r.Get("/", s.handleGetProject)
r.Get("/sections", s.handleListSections)
r.Get("/members", s.handleListMembers)
r.Get("/activity", s.handleActivity)
r.Group(func(r chi.Router) {
r.Use(s.requireProject(store.RoleEditor))
r.Post("/sections", s.handleCreateSection)
})
r.Group(func(r chi.Router) {
r.Use(s.requireProject(store.RoleOwner))
r.Patch("/", s.handleUpdateProject)
r.Delete("/", s.handleDeleteProject)
r.Post("/invites", s.handleInvite)
r.Patch("/members/{userID}", s.handleSetMemberRole)
r.Delete("/members/{userID}", s.handleRemoveMember)
})
})
})
// The instance's membership. Administrators only, and behind
// requireSession as well as requireAdmin: an API token belongs to a
// person, and a leaked one must not be able to mint an account or
// delete somebody else's.
r.Group(func(r chi.Router) {
r.Use(s.requireSession, s.requireAdmin)
r.Get("/errors", s.handleListErrors)
r.Get("/users", s.handleListUsers)
r.Post("/users", s.handleCreateUser)
r.Patch("/users/{userID}", s.handleUpdateUser)
r.Delete("/users/{userID}", s.handleDeleteUser)
r.Delete("/invites/{inviteID}", s.handleDeleteInvite)
})
// Groups are a person's own headings over their projects, so there is
// no project permission to check — every query here is scoped to the
// caller.
r.Route("/project-groups", func(r chi.Router) {
r.Get("/", s.handleListProjectGroups)
r.Post("/", s.handleCreateProjectGroup)
// Above /{groupID}, or chi reads "reorder" as an id.
r.Post("/reorder", s.handleReorderProjectGroups)
r.Patch("/{groupID}", s.handleUpdateProjectGroup)
r.Delete("/{groupID}", s.handleDeleteProjectGroup)
})
// The trash is outside the block above: a deleted project is invisible
// to the permission check by design, so these handlers resolve
// ownership themselves.
r.Get("/trash/projects", s.handleListTrashedProjects)
r.Post("/trash/projects/{projectID}/restore", s.handleRestoreProject)
r.Route("/sections/{sectionID}", func(r chi.Router) {
r.Patch("/", s.handleUpdateSection)
r.Delete("/", s.handleDeleteSection)
})
r.Route("/tasks", func(r chi.Router) {
r.Get("/", s.handleListTasks)
r.Post("/", s.handleCreateTask)
r.Post("/quick-add", s.handleQuickAdd)
r.Get("/quick-add/preview", s.handleQuickAddPreview)
r.Route("/{taskID}", func(r chi.Router) {
r.Get("/", s.handleGetTask)
r.Patch("/", s.handleUpdateTask)
r.Delete("/", s.handleDeleteTask)
r.Get("/comments", s.handleListComments)
r.Post("/comments", s.handleCreateComment)
r.Post("/attachments", s.handleUploadAttachment)
r.Get("/reminders", s.handleListReminders)
r.Post("/reminders", s.handleCreateReminder)
r.Post("/complete", s.handleCompleteTask)
r.Post("/reopen", s.handleReopenTask)
r.Post("/move", s.handleMoveTask)
})
})
})
})
r.NotFound(s.serveWeb)
s.router = r
return s
}
func (s *Server) ServeHTTP(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) { s.router.ServeHTTP(w, r) }
// Mail and Hub are exposed so the background jobs can deliver through the same
// sender and the same live connections the request path uses — a reminder should
// arrive in an open tab exactly as a colleague's edit does.
func (s *Server) Mail() *mail.Sender { return s.mail }
func (s *Server) Hub() *realtime.Hub { return s.hub }
// handleHealth reports whether verdande can actually serve requests, which means
// reaching the database — a process that is up but cannot read its own data is not
// healthy, and answering 200 for it would keep a broken container in rotation.
func (s *Server) handleHealth(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
ctx, cancel := contextWithTimeout(r, 2*time.Second)
defer cancel()
var one int
if err := s.db.QueryRowContext(ctx, `SELECT 1`).Scan(&one); err != nil {
s.log.Error("health check failed", "err", err)
writeJSON(w, http.StatusServiceUnavailable, map[string]string{
"status": "unhealthy",
"error": "database unreachable",
})
return
}
// The version travels with the health check because this is the one endpoint
// that answers without a session. "Which version is actually running?" is
// otherwise a question you cannot ask from outside — and after a deploy it is
// the first question there is.
writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, map[string]string{"status": "ok", "version": Version})
}
// serveWeb serves the PWA, falling back to index.html so that client-side routes
// survive a page reload. A request under /api that reaches here is a genuine 404 and
// must say so in JSON rather than being handed the HTML shell — a client parsing
// "<!doctype html>" as a JSON error message is a confusing way to learn about a typo.
func (s *Server) serveWeb(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
if strings.HasPrefix(r.URL.Path, "/api/") {
writeJSON(w, http.StatusNotFound, map[string]string{"error": "not found"})
return
}
// /.well-known/ is reserved by RFC 8615 and is never a route in the app.
// Handing back the shell there does not merely waste a response: it tells
// whoever asked that the thing they were looking for exists.
//
// That is not hypothetical. Claude probes
// /.well-known/oauth-authorization-server before connecting to an MCP server,
// read 200 and a page of HTML as "there is an authorization server here", and
// then failed trying to register with it — reporting a broken sign-in service
// on a server that has none and needs none. A 404 means "no OAuth here", the
// client stops asking, and the key in the URL is used as intended.
if strings.HasPrefix(r.URL.Path, "/.well-known/") {
writeJSON(w, http.StatusNotFound, map[string]string{"error": "not found"})
return
}
if s.web == nil {
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "text/plain; charset=utf-8")
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
w.Write([]byte("verdande — API is running. The web interface was not built into this binary.\n"))
return
}
name := strings.TrimPrefix(path.Clean(r.URL.Path), "/")
if name == "" || name == "." {
name = "index.html"
}
f, err := s.web.Open(name)
if errors.Is(err, fs.ErrNotExist) {
// A client-side route: hand back the shell and let the app route it.
name = "index.html"
f, err = s.web.Open(name)
}
if err != nil {
writeJSON(w, http.StatusNotFound, map[string]string{"error": "not found"})
return
}
defer f.Close()
info, err := f.Stat()
if err != nil || info.IsDir() {
writeJSON(w, http.StatusNotFound, map[string]string{"error": "not found"})
return
}
seeker, ok := f.(interface {
Read([]byte) (int, error)
Seek(int64, int) (int64, error)
})
if !ok {
writeJSON(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, map[string]string{"error": "cannot serve asset"})
return
}
// Hashed build assets are immutable; the shell must never be cached, or a
// deploy leaves people on the previous version until they hard-reload.
if strings.HasPrefix(name, "_app/immutable/") {
w.Header().Set("Cache-Control", "public, max-age=31536000, immutable")
} else {
w.Header().Set("Cache-Control", "no-cache")
}
http.ServeContent(w, r, name, info.ModTime(), seeker)
}
// securityHeaders sets the headers that are the same on every response.
func (s *Server) securityHeaders(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
h := w.Header()
h.Set("X-Content-Type-Options", "nosniff")
h.Set("X-Frame-Options", "DENY")
h.Set("Referrer-Policy", "same-origin")
h.Set("Content-Security-Policy", s.csp)
next.ServeHTTP(w, r)
})
}
func requestLogger(log *slog.Logger) func(http.Handler) http.Handler {
return func(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
start := time.Now()
ww := middleware.NewWrapResponseWriter(w, r.ProtoMajor)
next.ServeHTTP(ww, r)
level := slog.LevelInfo
if ww.Status() >= 500 {
level = slog.LevelError
}
// The health check runs every few seconds forever; logging it at info
// buries everything else.
if r.URL.Path == "/healthz" && ww.Status() < 400 {
level = slog.LevelDebug
}
log.Log(r.Context(), level, "request",
"method", r.Method,
"path", r.URL.Path,
"status", ww.Status(),
"bytes", ww.BytesWritten(),
"duration", time.Since(start).Round(time.Millisecond).String(),
// RealIP has already resolved this through the proxy headers, so
// behind a Cloudflare Tunnel it is the caller and not the tunnel.
// The panel's log watchers roll failed logins up per address.
"remote", r.RemoteAddr,
"request_id", middleware.GetReqID(r.Context()),
)
})
}
}
func writeJSON(w http.ResponseWriter, status int, v any) {
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json; charset=utf-8")
w.WriteHeader(status)
if err := json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(v); err != nil {
// The status line is already sent, so there is nothing to report to the
// client; this only ever means a dropped connection.
slog.Debug("write json response", "err", err)
}
}
// NewLogger returns the process logger. Text in development because a person is
// reading it; JSON in production because the panel and log tooling are.
func NewLogger(dev bool) *slog.Logger {
if dev {
return slog.New(slog.NewTextHandler(os.Stdout, &slog.HandlerOptions{Level: slog.LevelDebug}))
}
return slog.New(slog.NewJSONHandler(os.Stdout, &slog.HandlerOptions{Level: slog.LevelInfo}))
}