docs/api.md has told people to make a token under Settings since it was written. The store has held CreateAPIToken, ListAPITokens and DeleteAPIToken since the first migration. There were no routes: nothing between the two, and no way to make one. GET, POST and DELETE under /tokens, all behind a new requireSession middleware. A bearer token is refused there with 403 even though it is accepted everywhere else — otherwise a leaked token is permanent, because whoever has it issues a second one and revoking the first changes nothing. The plaintext comes back from POST and never again; only the hash is stored, so the interface has to say so at that moment rather than offering a reveal that cannot work. PATCH /auth/me alongside it. Name, timezone and language could not be changed anywhere — not through the API and not through the interface — and an account created from an invite inherits a default timezone. That is not cosmetic: every date in the app is resolved in it, so somebody in another country had every due date land an hour out with no way to say so. The zone is validated against the running system's database rather than a list kept here, which is the same database the dates are resolved with. The email address stays read-only: it identifies the account and is what invites were sent to. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
527 lines
17 KiB
Go
527 lines
17 KiB
Go
package httpapi
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import (
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"errors"
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"net/http"
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"net/mail"
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"strings"
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"time"
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"unicode/utf8"
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"github.com/kristianwind/verdande/internal/auth"
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"github.com/kristianwind/verdande/internal/store"
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)
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// userJSON is what the API says about a person. It deliberately does not carry the
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// password hash or the TOTP secret: those are not "fields that happen to be
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// private", they are values that must not leave the process, and the way to
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// guarantee that is for the response type not to have them.
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type userJSON struct {
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ID string `json:"id"`
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Email string `json:"email"`
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Name string `json:"name"`
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AvatarColor string `json:"avatar_color"`
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Timezone string `json:"timezone"`
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Locale string `json:"locale"`
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IsAdmin bool `json:"is_admin"`
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TOTPEnabled bool `json:"totp_enabled"`
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CreatedAt string `json:"created_at"`
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}
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func toUserJSON(u *store.User) userJSON {
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return userJSON{
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ID: u.ID, Email: u.Email, Name: u.Name, AvatarColor: u.AvatarColor,
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Timezone: u.Timezone, Locale: u.Locale, IsAdmin: u.IsAdmin,
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TOTPEnabled: u.TOTPEnabled, CreatedAt: u.CreatedAt.Format(time.RFC3339),
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}
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}
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// --- sign in -----------------------------------------------------------------
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type loginRequest struct {
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Email string `json:"email"`
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Password string `json:"password"`
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}
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type loginResponse struct {
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User *userJSON `json:"user,omitempty"`
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TOTPRequired bool `json:"totp_required"`
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}
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func (s *Server) handleLogin(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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var req loginRequest
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if err := decodeJSON(w, r, &req); err != nil {
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return
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}
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user, err := s.db.UserByEmail(r.Context(), req.Email)
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if err != nil || auth.VerifyPassword(user.PasswordHash, req.Password) != nil {
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// One message for "no such account" and for "wrong password". Telling them
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// apart turns the login form into a way to enumerate who has an account
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// here, which for a private instance is most of what an attacker wants.
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//
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// The timing still differs — a missing user skips the Argon2 work — and
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// closing that would mean hashing against a dummy on every miss. Not done:
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// it costs 19 MiB per probe and hands over an easy way to exhaust memory.
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writeError(w, http.StatusUnauthorized, CodeUnauthorized,
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"that email address and password do not match an account")
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return
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}
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// Argon2 parameters get raised over time; a login is the only moment the
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// plaintext exists and an upgrade is possible.
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if auth.NeedsRehash(user.PasswordHash) {
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if hash, err := auth.HashPassword(req.Password); err == nil {
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if err := s.db.UpdatePasswordHash(r.Context(), user.ID, hash, ""); err != nil {
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s.log.Warn("rehash password", "err", err, "user", user.ID)
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}
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}
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}
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s.loginLimiter.reset(clientIP(r))
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// A session that still needs a code gets a short life of its own: long enough
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// to fetch a phone, not long enough to be worth stealing.
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ttl := s.cfg.SessionTTL
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if user.TOTPEnabled {
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ttl = 10 * time.Minute
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}
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token, _, err := s.db.CreateSession(r.Context(), user.ID, r.UserAgent(), clientIP(r), ttl, user.TOTPEnabled)
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if err != nil {
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s.internal(w, "create session", err)
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return
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}
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s.setSessionCookie(w, token, ttl)
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if user.TOTPEnabled {
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writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, loginResponse{TOTPRequired: true})
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return
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}
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uj := toUserJSON(user)
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writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, loginResponse{User: &uj})
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}
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type totpRequest struct {
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Code string `json:"code"`
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}
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// handleLoginTOTP completes a two-step login. It runs behind requirePendingSession,
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// so it is reachable only by a session that has already passed the password step.
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func (s *Server) handleLoginTOTP(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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var req totpRequest
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if err := decodeJSON(w, r, &req); err != nil {
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return
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}
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user := userFrom(r.Context())
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session := sessionFrom(r.Context())
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err := auth.VerifyTOTP(user.TOTPSecret, req.Code, time.Now())
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if err != nil {
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// A recovery code is accepted in the same field. Making somebody find a
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// different form while locked out of their account is a poor time to
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// introduce a second concept.
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used, rerr := s.db.UseRecoveryCode(r.Context(), user.ID, req.Code)
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if rerr != nil || !used {
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writeError(w, http.StatusUnauthorized, CodeUnauthorized,
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"that verification code is not valid")
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return
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}
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s.log.Info("recovery code used", "user", user.ID)
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}
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if err := s.db.PromoteSession(r.Context(), session.ID, s.cfg.SessionTTL); err != nil {
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s.internal(w, "promote session", err)
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return
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}
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// The cookie is reissued so its lifetime matches the session's new one.
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if cookie, cerr := r.Cookie(s.cookieName()); cerr == nil {
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s.setSessionCookie(w, cookie.Value, s.cfg.SessionTTL)
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}
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uj := toUserJSON(user)
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writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, loginResponse{User: &uj})
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}
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func (s *Server) handleLogout(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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if session := sessionFrom(r.Context()); session != nil {
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if err := s.db.DeleteSession(r.Context(), session.ID); err != nil {
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s.log.Warn("delete session", "err", err)
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}
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}
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s.clearSessionCookie(w)
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w.WriteHeader(http.StatusNoContent)
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}
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func (s *Server) handleMe(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, toUserJSON(userFrom(r.Context())))
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}
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type updateProfileRequest struct {
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Name *string `json:"name"`
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Timezone *string `json:"timezone"`
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Locale *string `json:"locale"`
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}
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// handleUpdateProfile changes name, timezone and language.
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//
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// The timezone is not cosmetic: every date in the app is resolved in it, so "i
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// morgen kl 9" means a different instant after this call than before. Which is
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// exactly why it has to be changeable — an account created from an invite
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// inherits a default, and somebody in another country would otherwise have every
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// due date land an hour out with no way to say so.
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func (s *Server) handleUpdateProfile(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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var req updateProfileRequest
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if err := decodeJSON(w, r, &req); err != nil {
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return
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}
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user := userFrom(r.Context())
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name, timezone, locale := user.Name, user.Timezone, user.Locale
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fields := map[string]string{}
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if req.Name != nil {
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name = strings.TrimSpace(*req.Name)
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if name == "" {
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fields["name"] = "required"
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} else if utf8.RuneCountInString(name) > 80 {
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fields["name"] = "must be at most 80 characters"
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}
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}
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if req.Timezone != nil {
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timezone = strings.TrimSpace(*req.Timezone)
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// Checked against the running system's zone database rather than a list
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// kept here: a hardcoded list goes stale every time a country moves its
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// clocks, and this one is the same database the dates are resolved with.
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if _, err := time.LoadLocation(timezone); err != nil || timezone == "" {
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fields["timezone"] = "must be a zone like Europe/Copenhagen"
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}
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}
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if req.Locale != nil {
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locale = strings.TrimSpace(*req.Locale)
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// The locale picks which quick-add grammar parses a line, so an unknown
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// one would quietly stop "i morgen" being understood.
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if locale != "da" && locale != "en" {
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fields["locale"] = "must be da or en"
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}
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}
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if len(fields) > 0 {
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writeFieldErrors(w, fields)
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return
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}
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if err := s.db.UpdateProfile(r.Context(), user.ID, name, timezone, locale); err != nil {
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s.storeError(w, "update profile", err)
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return
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}
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updated, err := s.db.UserByID(r.Context(), user.ID)
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if err != nil {
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s.internal(w, "reload user", err)
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return
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}
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writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, toUserJSON(updated))
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}
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// --- creating accounts --------------------------------------------------------
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type signupRequest struct {
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Token string `json:"token"`
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Name string `json:"name"`
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Password string `json:"password"`
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Timezone string `json:"timezone,omitempty"`
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Locale string `json:"locale,omitempty"`
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}
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// handleSignup creates an account from an invite. There is no open registration:
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// the email address comes from the invite, not from the form, so an invite cannot
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// be redirected to somebody else.
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func (s *Server) handleSignup(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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var req signupRequest
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if err := decodeJSON(w, r, &req); err != nil {
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return
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}
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invite, err := s.db.InviteByToken(r.Context(), req.Token)
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if err != nil {
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writeError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, CodeBadRequest,
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"this invite link is not valid or has expired")
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return
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}
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fields := map[string]string{}
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name := strings.TrimSpace(req.Name)
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if name == "" {
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fields["name"] = "required"
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}
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if msg := checkPassword(req.Password); msg != "" {
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fields["password"] = msg
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}
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if len(fields) > 0 {
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writeFieldErrors(w, fields)
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return
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}
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hash, err := auth.HashPassword(req.Password)
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if err != nil {
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s.internal(w, "hash password", err)
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return
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}
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user := &store.User{
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Email: invite.Email, Name: name, PasswordHash: hash,
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Timezone: req.Timezone, Locale: req.Locale,
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}
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if err := s.db.CreateUser(r.Context(), user, inboxName(req.Locale)); err != nil {
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if errors.Is(err, store.ErrEmailInUse) {
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writeError(w, http.StatusConflict, CodeConflict,
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"an account already exists for that email address")
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return
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}
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s.internal(w, "create user", err)
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return
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}
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// Accepting the invite is what adds the membership and burns the token, in one
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// transaction: a signup that half-succeeded would leave a usable invite behind.
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if err := s.db.AcceptInvite(r.Context(), invite.ID, user.ID); err != nil {
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s.internal(w, "accept invite", err)
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return
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}
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s.startSession(w, r, user)
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}
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type bootstrapRequest struct {
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Email string `json:"email"`
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Name string `json:"name"`
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Password string `json:"password"`
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Timezone string `json:"timezone,omitempty"`
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Locale string `json:"locale,omitempty"`
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}
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// handleBootstrap creates the first administrator, and only ever the first: the
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// endpoint refuses once any account exists. That is what makes it safe to leave
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// unauthenticated — it has to be, because there is nobody to authenticate as yet.
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//
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// The race matters. Two requests arriving together must not both see an empty
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// database, so the check and the insert happen in one transaction inside the store.
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func (s *Server) handleBootstrap(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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var req bootstrapRequest
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if err := decodeJSON(w, r, &req); err != nil {
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return
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}
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fields := map[string]string{}
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if _, err := mail.ParseAddress(req.Email); err != nil {
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fields["email"] = "must be an email address"
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}
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if strings.TrimSpace(req.Name) == "" {
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fields["name"] = "required"
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}
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if msg := checkPassword(req.Password); msg != "" {
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fields["password"] = msg
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}
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if len(fields) > 0 {
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writeFieldErrors(w, fields)
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return
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}
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hash, err := auth.HashPassword(req.Password)
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if err != nil {
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s.internal(w, "hash password", err)
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return
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}
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user := &store.User{
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Email: req.Email, Name: strings.TrimSpace(req.Name), PasswordHash: hash,
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IsAdmin: true, Timezone: req.Timezone, Locale: req.Locale,
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}
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if err := s.db.CreateFirstAdmin(r.Context(), user, inboxName(req.Locale)); err != nil {
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if errors.Is(err, store.ErrAlreadySetUp) {
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writeError(w, http.StatusConflict, CodeConflict, "this instance is already set up")
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return
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}
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s.internal(w, "create first admin", err)
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return
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}
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s.log.Info("first administrator created", "user", user.ID, "email", user.Email)
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s.startSession(w, r, user)
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}
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// handleSetupState tells the sign-in page whether to offer setup or a login form.
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// It reveals only whether any account exists, which anyone can determine anyway by
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// looking at whether the setup form works.
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func (s *Server) handleSetupState(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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n, err := s.db.UserCount(r.Context())
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if err != nil {
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s.internal(w, "count users", err)
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return
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}
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writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, map[string]bool{"needs_setup": n == 0})
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}
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func (s *Server) startSession(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, user *store.User) {
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token, _, err := s.db.CreateSession(r.Context(), user.ID, r.UserAgent(), clientIP(r), s.cfg.SessionTTL, false)
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if err != nil {
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s.internal(w, "create session", err)
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return
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}
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s.setSessionCookie(w, token, s.cfg.SessionTTL)
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uj := toUserJSON(user)
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writeJSON(w, http.StatusCreated, loginResponse{User: &uj})
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}
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// --- password reset -----------------------------------------------------------
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type forgotRequest struct {
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Email string `json:"email"`
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}
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// handleForgotPassword always answers the same way.
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//
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// Saying "no account with that address" would turn this into an account-existence
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// oracle that needs no password at all. The cost is that somebody who mistypes
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// their address waits for an email that never comes, which is the better failure.
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func (s *Server) handleForgotPassword(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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var req forgotRequest
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if err := decodeJSON(w, r, &req); err != nil {
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return
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}
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user, err := s.db.UserByEmail(r.Context(), req.Email)
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if err == nil {
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token, err := s.db.CreatePasswordReset(r.Context(), user.ID, s.cfg.ResetTTL)
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if err != nil {
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s.internal(w, "create password reset", err)
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return
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}
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link := s.cfg.BaseURL + "/reset?token=" + token
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if err := s.mail.SendPasswordReset(r.Context(), user.Email, user.Name, link, s.cfg.ResetTTL); err != nil {
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s.log.Error("send password reset", "err", err, "user", user.ID)
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}
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}
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writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, map[string]string{
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"status": "if that address has an account, a reset link is on its way",
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})
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}
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type resetRequest struct {
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Token string `json:"token"`
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Password string `json:"password"`
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}
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func (s *Server) handleResetPassword(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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var req resetRequest
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if err := decodeJSON(w, r, &req); err != nil {
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return
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}
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if msg := checkPassword(req.Password); msg != "" {
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writeFieldErrors(w, map[string]string{"password": msg})
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return
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}
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userID, err := s.db.UsePasswordReset(r.Context(), req.Token)
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if err != nil {
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writeError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, CodeBadRequest,
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"this reset link is not valid or has expired")
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return
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}
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hash, err := auth.HashPassword(req.Password)
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if err != nil {
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s.internal(w, "hash password", err)
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return
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}
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// Every session ends: a password reset is what somebody does when they think
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// another person has been in their account.
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if err := s.db.UpdatePasswordHash(r.Context(), userID, hash, ""); err != nil {
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s.internal(w, "update password", err)
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return
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}
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w.WriteHeader(http.StatusNoContent)
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}
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type changePasswordRequest struct {
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CurrentPassword string `json:"current_password"`
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NewPassword string `json:"new_password"`
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}
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func (s *Server) handleChangePassword(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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var req changePasswordRequest
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if err := decodeJSON(w, r, &req); err != nil {
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return
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}
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user := userFrom(r.Context())
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// The current password is required even though the caller is signed in: it is
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// what stops an unattended laptop from becoming a permanent account takeover.
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if err := auth.VerifyPassword(user.PasswordHash, req.CurrentPassword); err != nil {
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writeFieldErrors(w, map[string]string{"current_password": "not correct"})
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return
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}
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if msg := checkPassword(req.NewPassword); msg != "" {
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writeFieldErrors(w, map[string]string{"new_password": msg})
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return
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}
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hash, err := auth.HashPassword(req.NewPassword)
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if err != nil {
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s.internal(w, "hash password", err)
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return
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}
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keep := ""
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if session := sessionFrom(r.Context()); session != nil {
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keep = session.ID
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}
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if err := s.db.UpdatePasswordHash(r.Context(), user.ID, hash, keep); err != nil {
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s.internal(w, "update password", err)
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusNoContent)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// --- validation ---------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
|
|
// Password rules, and only these.
|
|
//
|
|
// A length floor and nothing else is deliberate. Composition rules — a digit, a
|
|
// symbol, a capital — measurably push people towards "Password1!" and are no longer
|
|
// recommended by NIST or OWASP. Length is what actually helps, and a passphrase
|
|
// must not be rejected for lacking punctuation.
|
|
const (
|
|
minPasswordLength = 10
|
|
maxPasswordLength = 1024 // Argon2 will hash anything; this bounds the work
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
func checkPassword(p string) string {
|
|
switch {
|
|
case p == "":
|
|
return "required"
|
|
case utf8.RuneCountInString(p) < minPasswordLength:
|
|
return "must be at least 10 characters"
|
|
case len(p) > maxPasswordLength:
|
|
return "is too long"
|
|
}
|
|
return ""
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// inboxName is the one string that has to be right at account creation, before the
|
|
// user has ever seen a settings page to state a preference on.
|
|
func inboxName(locale string) string {
|
|
if strings.HasPrefix(strings.ToLower(locale), "en") {
|
|
return "Inbox"
|
|
}
|
|
return "Indbakke"
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// internal logs the real error and tells the client nothing about it. The detail
|
|
// belongs in the log, where the operator can see it; in the response it would be a
|
|
// description of the server's internals handed to whoever asked.
|
|
func (s *Server) internal(w http.ResponseWriter, what string, err error) {
|
|
s.log.Error(what, "err", err)
|
|
writeError(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, CodeInternal, "something went wrong")
|
|
}
|