Release / Build and publish image (push) Failing after 9m54s
**H2 — SSRF gennem AI-udbyderens adresse.** `base_url` blev gemt uden kontrol og hentet med en almindelig klient, og udbyderens svar blev givet tilbage ordret. Det var en fungerende skanner af det interne net for enhver bruger: peg den på en vært, læs de første tre hundrede bytes af det, der svarede. På en homelab er det det meste af, hvad der er værd at nå. Nu gennem `safedial`, og svarets krop går i loggen frem for i svaret. Operatøren har stadig brug for beskeden — for en lokal model er den som regel selve problemet — så den er der, bare kun for den, der kører instansen. **M2 — Web Push havde tre.** Endepunktet blev gemt ukontrolleret og POSTet til på en tidsplan, den, der ringer, selv vælger: sæt en påmindelse et minut ude, og serveren henter adressen, hvert minut. Upserten flyttede desuden ejerskabet med `user_id = excluded.user_id`, så enhver, der kendte en andens endepunkt, kunne overtage det — offerets telefon ville få angriberens beskeder og ingen af sine egne. Og `DeletePushSubscription` havde ingen ejer-kontrol. **H3 — tre veje uden loft.** FTS-udtrykket byggede omkring halvtreds bytes pr. ord uden grænse; en søgning på en kvart megabyte blev til to megabyte MATCH-udtryk og seksogtyve sekunder inde i SQLite, mens den holdt på én af kun fire til otte forbindelser. Nogle få af dem samtidig, og databasen er utilgængelig for alle på instansen, logins inklusive. `filterquery.Parse` er kvadratisk — halvtreds tusind led er syv sekunders CPU og seksogfyrre gigabyte allokering i én forespørgsel — og havde hverken loft på antal eller på dybde. Og noteimporten læste hver fil i arkivet uden grænse: 64 MB komprimeret kan blive til seksogtres gigabyte skrevet ned på den disk, databasen ligger på. **M1 — `comment_id` blev taget på tro.** Rettighedskontrollen så på opgaven i adressen, mens filen blev hængt på den kommentar, formularen bad om. En viewer på et delt projekt kan liste dets kommentarer, så hun kunne læse et id og lægge en fil under en andens kommentar i et projekt, hun kun må læse. **M4 — fire hemmeligheder lå i klartekst i hver sikkerhedskopi.** TOTP-koden og AI-nøglen forsegles nu; begge konverterer sig selv næste gang de skrives. Kalenderfeedets og mailadressens tokens gør ikke — de slås op på deres præcise værdi og vises i fladen mere end én gang, hvilket en hash ikke kan. Det står nu skrevet i `SECURITY.md`, som påstod det modsatte. At rette det betyder, at adressen kun kan vises én gang, og det er en beslutning om, hvordan funktionen virker. Og en prøve på, at politikken overhovedet bliver sendt. Det var den, der gjorde XSS-en i nat til indsat HTML frem for kørt script, og der var ingen prøve, der rørte den — en foranstaltning, ingen prøve rører, kan forsvinde i en oprydning, uden at nogen opdager det. Målt på script-src alene: `style-src 'unsafe-inline'` står der med vilje, og en indsat stil kan gøre en side grim, ikke køre kode. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
448 lines
14 KiB
Go
448 lines
14 KiB
Go
package store
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import (
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"context"
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"database/sql"
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"encoding/json"
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"errors"
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"fmt"
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"time"
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"github.com/kristianwind/verdande/internal/auth"
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)
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type Notification struct {
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ID string
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UserID string
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ActorID string
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ActorName string
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ProjectID string
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TaskID string
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Kind string
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Title string
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Body string
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ReadAt *time.Time
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CreatedAt time.Time
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}
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func (db *DB) CreateNotification(ctx context.Context, n *Notification) error {
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if n.ID == "" {
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n.ID = NewID()
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}
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n.CreatedAt = time.Now().UTC()
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_, err := db.ExecContext(ctx,
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`INSERT INTO notifications (id, user_id, actor_id, project_id, task_id, kind,
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title, body, created_at)
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VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?)`,
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n.ID, n.UserID, nullString(n.ActorID), nullString(n.ProjectID),
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nullString(n.TaskID), n.Kind, n.Title, n.Body, n.CreatedAt.Unix())
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return err
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}
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func (db *DB) ListNotifications(ctx context.Context, userID string, limit int) ([]Notification, error) {
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if limit <= 0 || limit > 100 {
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limit = 30
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}
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rows, err := db.QueryContext(ctx, `
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SELECT n.id, n.user_id, n.actor_id, COALESCE(u.name, ''), n.project_id, n.task_id,
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n.kind, n.title, n.body, n.read_at, n.created_at
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FROM notifications n
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LEFT JOIN users u ON u.id = n.actor_id
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WHERE n.user_id = ?
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ORDER BY n.created_at DESC
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LIMIT ?`, userID, limit)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, err
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}
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defer rows.Close()
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out := []Notification{}
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for rows.Next() {
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var n Notification
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var actorID, projectID, taskID sql.NullString
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var readAt sql.NullInt64
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var created int64
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if err := rows.Scan(&n.ID, &n.UserID, &actorID, &n.ActorName, &projectID,
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&taskID, &n.Kind, &n.Title, &n.Body, &readAt, &created); err != nil {
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return nil, err
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}
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n.ActorID, n.ProjectID, n.TaskID = actorID.String, projectID.String, taskID.String
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if readAt.Valid {
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v := time.Unix(readAt.Int64, 0).UTC()
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n.ReadAt = &v
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}
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n.CreatedAt = time.Unix(created, 0).UTC()
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out = append(out, n)
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}
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return out, rows.Err()
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}
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func (db *DB) UnreadNotificationCount(ctx context.Context, userID string) (int, error) {
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var n int
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err := db.QueryRowContext(ctx,
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`SELECT count(*) FROM notifications WHERE user_id = ? AND read_at IS NULL`,
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userID).Scan(&n)
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return n, err
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}
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// MarkNotificationsRead marks one, or all of them when id is empty.
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func (db *DB) MarkNotificationsRead(ctx context.Context, userID, id string) error {
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query := `UPDATE notifications SET read_at = ? WHERE user_id = ? AND read_at IS NULL`
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args := []any{time.Now().Unix(), userID}
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if id != "" {
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query += ` AND id = ?`
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args = append(args, id)
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}
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_, err := db.ExecContext(ctx, query, args...)
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return err
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}
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// ProjectMemberIDs is everyone who can see a project, owner included — the audience
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// for a notification about something that happened inside it.
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func (db *DB) ProjectMemberIDs(ctx context.Context, projectID string) ([]string, error) {
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rows, err := db.QueryContext(ctx, `
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SELECT owner_id FROM projects WHERE id = ?
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UNION
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SELECT user_id FROM project_members WHERE project_id = ?`, projectID, projectID)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, err
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}
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defer rows.Close()
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var out []string
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for rows.Next() {
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var id string
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if err := rows.Scan(&id); err != nil {
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return nil, err
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}
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out = append(out, id)
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}
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return out, rows.Err()
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}
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// --- Web Push subscriptions --------------------------------------------------------
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type PushSubscription struct {
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ID string
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UserID string
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Endpoint string
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P256dh string
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Auth string
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UserAgent string
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Failures int
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}
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// SavePushSubscription is an upsert on the endpoint: a browser that re-subscribes
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// produces the same endpoint, and a second row would mean two identical
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// notifications on one device.
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func (db *DB) SavePushSubscription(ctx context.Context, sub *PushSubscription) error {
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if sub.ID == "" {
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sub.ID = NewID()
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}
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// The upsert no longer moves the row between accounts.
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//
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// `user_id = excluded.user_id` was in the DO UPDATE, so anybody who learned
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// another person's endpoint could claim it by subscribing with it: the
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// victim's device would then receive the claimant's notifications and none of
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// its own. A re-subscribe from the same person still refreshes the keys, which
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// is what the upsert is actually for.
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_, err := db.ExecContext(ctx,
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`INSERT INTO push_subscriptions (id, user_id, endpoint, p256dh, auth, user_agent, created_at)
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VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?)
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ON CONFLICT (endpoint) DO UPDATE SET
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p256dh = excluded.p256dh,
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auth = excluded.auth,
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user_agent = excluded.user_agent,
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failures = 0`,
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sub.ID, sub.UserID, sub.Endpoint, sub.P256dh, sub.Auth, sub.UserAgent,
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time.Now().Unix())
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return err
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}
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func (db *DB) ListPushSubscriptions(ctx context.Context, userID string) ([]PushSubscription, error) {
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rows, err := db.QueryContext(ctx,
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`SELECT id, user_id, endpoint, p256dh, auth, user_agent, failures
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FROM push_subscriptions WHERE user_id = ?`, userID)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, err
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}
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defer rows.Close()
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out := []PushSubscription{}
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for rows.Next() {
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var s PushSubscription
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if err := rows.Scan(&s.ID, &s.UserID, &s.Endpoint, &s.P256dh, &s.Auth,
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&s.UserAgent, &s.Failures); err != nil {
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return nil, err
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}
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out = append(out, s)
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}
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return out, rows.Err()
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}
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// DeletePushSubscription removes one of this person's devices.
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//
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// Scoped by user as well as by endpoint. It was endpoint alone, which meant
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// anybody who learned somebody else's endpoint could silently unsubscribe their
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// phone — and the endpoint is the only thing about a subscription that ever
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// leaves the browser.
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func (db *DB) DeletePushSubscription(ctx context.Context, userID, endpoint string) error {
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_, err := db.ExecContext(ctx,
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`DELETE FROM push_subscriptions WHERE endpoint = ? AND user_id = ?`, endpoint, userID)
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return err
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}
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// dropPushEndpoint removes a subscription the push service has declared dead.
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// Unexported so the only *request* path to a delete stays the scoped one.
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func (db *DB) dropPushEndpoint(ctx context.Context, endpoint string) error {
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_, err := db.ExecContext(ctx, `DELETE FROM push_subscriptions WHERE endpoint = ?`, endpoint)
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return err
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}
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// RecordPushFailure counts a delivery failure and drops the subscription once it
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// has failed enough times. A push service says 404 or 410 when an endpoint is gone,
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// but it also has bad days — forgiving a few failures keeps a flaky network from
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// silently unsubscribing somebody's phone.
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func (db *DB) RecordPushFailure(ctx context.Context, endpoint string, permanent bool) error {
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if permanent {
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// Not scoped by user, and that is right here: this is the push service
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// saying the endpoint is gone, not a person asking for something. There is
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// no caller to check against — the caller is the delivery job.
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return db.dropPushEndpoint(ctx, endpoint)
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}
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_, err := db.ExecContext(ctx,
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`UPDATE push_subscriptions SET failures = failures + 1 WHERE endpoint = ?`, endpoint)
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if err != nil {
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return err
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}
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_, err = db.ExecContext(ctx,
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`DELETE FROM push_subscriptions WHERE endpoint = ? AND failures >= 10`, endpoint)
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return err
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}
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// --- VAPID keypair ------------------------------------------------------------------
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// InstanceKeys returns the VAPID keypair, generating it on first use.
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//
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// Generated rather than configured: it identifies this instance to push services
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// and is not something an operator should have to produce. Rotating it only costs
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// every browser re-subscribing.
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func (db *DB) InstanceKeys(ctx context.Context, generate func() (public, private string, err error)) (string, string, error) {
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var public, private string
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err := db.QueryRowContext(ctx,
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`SELECT public_key, private_key FROM instance_keys LIMIT 1`).Scan(&public, &private)
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if err == nil {
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return public, private, nil
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}
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if err != sql.ErrNoRows {
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return "", "", err
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}
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public, private, err = generate()
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if err != nil {
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return "", "", err
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}
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_, err = db.ExecContext(ctx,
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`INSERT INTO instance_keys (id, public_key, private_key, created_at) VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?)`,
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NewID(), public, private, time.Now().Unix())
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if err != nil {
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// Another request generated one first; take theirs so the two agree.
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var existingPub, existingPriv string
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if qErr := db.QueryRowContext(ctx,
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`SELECT public_key, private_key FROM instance_keys LIMIT 1`).
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Scan(&existingPub, &existingPriv); qErr == nil {
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return existingPub, existingPriv, nil
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}
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return "", "", err
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}
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return public, private, nil
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}
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// --- mail-to-task tokens -------------------------------------------------------------
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func (db *DB) EnsureMailToken(ctx context.Context, userID string) (string, error) {
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var token sql.NullString
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err := db.QueryRowContext(ctx, `SELECT mail_token FROM users WHERE id = ?`, userID).Scan(&token)
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if err != nil {
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return "", err
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}
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if token.Valid && token.String != "" {
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return token.String, nil
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}
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fresh, err := auth.NewToken()
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if err != nil {
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return "", err
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}
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if err := db.SetMailToken(ctx, userID, fresh); err != nil {
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return "", err
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}
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return fresh, nil
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}
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func (db *DB) SetMailToken(ctx context.Context, userID, token string) error {
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_, err := db.ExecContext(ctx,
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`UPDATE users SET mail_token = ?, updated_at = ? WHERE id = ?`,
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token, time.Now().Unix(), userID)
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return err
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}
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func (db *DB) UserByMailToken(ctx context.Context, token string) (*User, error) {
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if token == "" {
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return nil, ErrNotFound
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}
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return db.scanUser(ctx, `SELECT `+userColumns+` FROM users WHERE mail_token = ?`, token)
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}
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// --- per-user settings ------------------------------------------------------------------
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// UserSettings reads one scope of a person's integration settings. A missing row is
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// an empty map, not an error: nobody has settings until they set some.
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// --- sealed values ----------------------------------------------------------------
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// secretFields are the keys whose values never leave this process in the clear.
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//
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// A named set rather than "seal everything": the rest of a settings blob is what
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// somebody reads when a mailbox misbehaves — which folder, which label, which
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// address — and turning all of it into ciphertext would buy nothing and cost the
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// ability to look.
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var secretFields = map[string]bool{
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"refresh_token": true,
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"access_token": true,
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"password": true,
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"client_secret": true,
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// The AI provider's key. Missed when this list was written, and it is exactly
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// the same kind of thing as the rest: a live credential, in a settings blob,
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// in a database anybody with a backup file can read. Existing rows convert
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// themselves the next time the settings are saved.
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"api_key": true,
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}
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// seal returns a copy of values with the secret fields sealed. Without a key it
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// returns them untouched, which is what the tests that never set one expect.
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func (db *DB) seal(values map[string]any) (map[string]any, error) {
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if db.box == nil {
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return values, nil
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}
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out := make(map[string]any, len(values))
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for k, v := range values {
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s, ok := v.(string)
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if !secretFields[k] || !ok {
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out[k] = v
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continue
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}
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sealed, err := db.box.Seal(s)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("seal %s: %w", k, err)
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}
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out[k] = sealed
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}
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return out, nil
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}
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// unseal is seal's other direction. Values written before there was a key come
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// back as themselves; the next write puts them away properly, so the column
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// converts itself as it is used rather than in one migration that has to be right
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// about every row at once.
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func (db *DB) unseal(values map[string]any) (map[string]any, error) {
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if db.box == nil {
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return values, nil
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}
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for k, v := range values {
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s, ok := v.(string)
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if !secretFields[k] || !ok {
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continue
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}
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plain, err := db.box.Unseal(s)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("read %s: %w", k, err)
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}
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values[k] = plain
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}
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return values, nil
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}
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func (db *DB) UserSettings(ctx context.Context, userID, scope string) (map[string]any, error) {
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var raw string
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err := db.QueryRowContext(ctx,
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`SELECT values_json FROM user_settings WHERE user_id = ? AND scope = ?`,
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userID, scope).Scan(&raw)
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if err == sql.ErrNoRows {
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return map[string]any{}, nil
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}
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if err != nil {
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return nil, err
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}
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values := map[string]any{}
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if err := json.Unmarshal([]byte(raw), &values); err != nil {
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return map[string]any{}, nil
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}
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return db.unseal(values)
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}
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func (db *DB) SetUserSettings(ctx context.Context, userID, scope string, values map[string]any) error {
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values, err := db.seal(values)
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if err != nil {
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return err
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}
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raw, err := json.Marshal(values)
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if err != nil {
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return err
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}
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_, err = db.ExecContext(ctx, `
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INSERT INTO user_settings (user_id, scope, values_json, updated_at)
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VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?)
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ON CONFLICT (user_id) DO UPDATE SET
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scope = excluded.scope,
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values_json = excluded.values_json,
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updated_at = excluded.updated_at`,
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userID, scope, string(raw), time.Now().Unix())
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return err
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}
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// --- instance-wide settings -------------------------------------------------------------
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// InstanceSettings reads one scope of the instance's own settings. A missing row
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// is an empty map, not an error.
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//
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// Separate from UserSettings because some configuration is the server's rather
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// than a person's — the Gmail OAuth client is one registration that everybody
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// connecting a mailbox goes through, not a preference each of them holds.
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func (db *DB) InstanceSettings(ctx context.Context, scope string) (map[string]any, error) {
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var raw string
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err := db.QueryRowContext(ctx,
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`SELECT values_json FROM instance_settings WHERE scope = ?`, scope).Scan(&raw)
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if errors.Is(err, sql.ErrNoRows) {
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return map[string]any{}, nil
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}
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if err != nil {
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return nil, err
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}
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values := map[string]any{}
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if err := json.Unmarshal([]byte(raw), &values); err != nil {
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return map[string]any{}, nil
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}
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return db.unseal(values)
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}
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func (db *DB) SetInstanceSettings(ctx context.Context, scope string, values map[string]any) error {
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values, err := db.seal(values)
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if err != nil {
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return err
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}
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raw, err := json.Marshal(values)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return err
|
|
}
|
|
_, err = db.ExecContext(ctx, `
|
|
INSERT INTO instance_settings (scope, values_json, updated_at)
|
|
VALUES (?, ?, ?)
|
|
ON CONFLICT (scope) DO UPDATE SET
|
|
values_json = excluded.values_json,
|
|
updated_at = excluded.updated_at`,
|
|
scope, string(raw), time.Now().Unix())
|
|
return err
|
|
}
|