c2e2d66e76d8074ef28c67bd0dd5bca7a79fc6f5
22
Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
 Kristian WindandClaude Opus 5
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c2e2d66e76 |
feat(admin): keep server errors where a restart cannot take them
Release / Build and publish image (push) Failing after 12m56s
The panel's watcher reported four 5xx today — twice from one address at 11:49, twice from another at 10:45 — and there is no way to find out what any of them were. verdande logs the real cause of every 500, but on a Rune the log belongs to the container and the container is replaced on every restart. So an operator is told that something broke and given nothing to act on, which is the worst of both: alarming and useless. Every 500 now writes a row: what the handler was attempting in its own words, the error it hit, the method and path, who was asking, and the request id that ties it back to the log line for whoever still has it. The "what" is the part a status code cannot give — "list projects" and "move task" are the difference between a fault you can find and one you can only count. Written best-effort and never checked. This is the path that is already reporting a failure, and a diagnostic that can itself fail the request would turn one broken screen into two. Threading the request through `internal()` and `storeError()` touched 108 call sites across 19 files, which is the price of not having had it there from the start. It is mechanical and the compiler checked all of it. Kept for thirty days by the nightly sweep: long enough to answer "what happened last week", short enough that a fault loop cannot fill the volume the tasks live on. Read at Indstillinger → Fejl, administrators only — it carries paths, account names and the server's own error strings. The empty state says "Ingen fejl registreret. Det er den rigtige tilstand", because a blank panel should not read as a broken one. The test drops a table and asks for the endpoint that reads it: the same code path a disk error takes, and the row that comes back has to name the operation, the account and the request. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Kristian WindandClaude Opus 5
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35d9e3bdac |
feat: an assignee on the row, and the activity log made visible
Release / Build and publish image (push) Failing after 10m2s
Two more things the database has been recording and the interface has
never shown.
**Who a task is waiting on, on the row.** Only when it is not you: your own
list would otherwise carry your own face on every line, which is a column
of one initial telling you nothing. The point of showing an assignee is
that it is somebody else.
That needed names, and a task carries only an `assignee_id`. `GET /people`
is the primitive: everybody you share a project with, plus yourself,
fetched once per session. Not per row, and not per project either — a list
would have to know which project each task belongs to before it could ask
for that project's members. Deliberately *not* the instance's user list,
which is `/users` and administrators only: a task list has no business
enumerating everybody with an account here.
It sits first in the meta line, because who changes what the rest of the
line means — a date on somebody else's task is their deadline, not yours.
**And the activity log.** Nineteen kinds of entry have been written since
the beginning — every project, section, member, task and comment event —
and `GET /projects/{id}/activity` has answered honestly the whole time with
nothing on the other end. There is a Historik panel on the project now,
loaded when it is opened rather than with the page, and the event keys
become Danish in exactly one place. An unknown key falls through to itself
rather than being hidden: a build that records something this table has not
learned should still show that it happened.
One test assertion had to change, and it is worth saying why. It matched
"males inden fredag" against a row whose title is "males inden" — quick add
read "fredag" as the due date — so it was really matching the title
concatenated with the metadata beside it. Putting the assignee between them
broke it. The assertion now names the task's own text.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Kristian WindandClaude Opus 5
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b6ea87ac19 |
feat(projects): change a member's role from the member list
An invite sent with the wrong role could not be corrected. The only way back was to remove the person and invite them again — and removing a member unassigns every task they were responsible for, so fixing a dropdown cost somebody their work. This is the other side of "an external user cannot create tasks": the rule was right, the role was wrong, and there was no way to say so. PATCH against a membership that already exists, not the upsert AddMember does. Somebody who is not a member is not silently made one: that is an invite, it belongs to the invite flow, and doing it here would let a typo in a user id add a stranger to a project without anybody being asked. The owner is refused, with the real reason rather than the true but useless one. Ownership lives on the project rather than in project_members, so the plain answer would have been "not a member" — which is correct and tells nobody anything. Ownership is transferred, not granted, and two owners is a state with no way to settle a disagreement about who may remove whom. In the list, the owner's standing is text and everybody else's is a dropdown. A disabled control would be a thing that exists to say no. And the roles are finally in Danish. The API's words are `owner`, `editor` and `viewer`, and they were being printed straight into a Danish page; the list now uses the same three phrases the invite form beside it already did. The smoke test drives both browsers, because the interesting part is that the other one's permissions really change: a viewer is told the project is read-only and has no quick-add box, the owner promotes them from the list, and after a reload the box is there and the notice is gone. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Kristian WindandClaude Opus 5
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e8ebd0fa78 |
feat(admin): a page for who is on the instance, and how somebody else gets on it
Release / Build and publish image (push) Failing after 10m0s
The README has promised "internal users are created by an admin" since the beginning and there was no such thing. There are exactly two ways an account has ever come into existence: the first admin at setup, and somebody accepting an invite to a project. So the only way to add a person was to share a project with them first. The store has been ready the whole time. CreateInvite already documents that "projectID may be empty, which invites somebody to the instance rather than to a particular project", and AcceptInvite already has the branch that grants no membership when there is none. requireAdmin has existed in the middleware and was used nowhere. This wires those three together and puts a page on them. An invite rather than an account with a password the administrator picks. A password typed here would be known to two people before it was ever used, and would then have to travel to the second one by some channel nobody has thought about. No name is asked for either — the signup form asks the person, and a name an administrator guesses is a name somebody has to correct. Two refusals keep the instance administrable: the last administrator cannot be demoted or deleted, and nobody can delete the account they are signed in as. Both are enforced on the server; the interface simply does not draw the buttons on your own row, because a button whose only purpose is to be refused wastes a click to teach a rule. The last-admin refusal gets its own error code, because "that already exists" is not what happened and this is the one refusal a person needs explained. Deleting an account is the only hard delete in this database, and building the confirmation is what turned up how wide it goes. `projects.owner_id` cascades, which is expected. But `tasks.created_by` cascades too — so removing a colleague deletes every task they ever wrote, including in projects somebody else owns. The count in the list says so, and the confirmation says it in words. Changing that to ON DELETE SET NULL, so the work stays and loses its author, means rebuilding the tasks table and its FTS triggers: worth doing, not worth doing quietly while adding a screen. It is written down in the store instead. Pending invites are listed and can be withdrawn. Only the token's hash is stored, so a link sent to the wrong address cannot be looked up and resent — withdrawing it is the only way to stop it before it expires. Six API tests for the guards and the counts, and two smoke tests: the whole loop from invite to a second browser creating the account and appearing in the list as somebody who is not an administrator, and the absence of buttons on your own row. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Kristian WindandClaude Opus 5
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4276892590 |
feat(auth): see where you are signed in, and end one of them
`last_seen_at` has been written on every request since sessions existed —
throttled to once a minute, deliberately, so a list could one day say
"denne enhed, lige nu" — and nothing has ever read it. The store even had
ListSessions. What was missing was two routes and a panel.
GET /auth/sessions lists them, most recently used first, with the current
one marked so nobody has to work out which row is the browser they are
reading it in. DELETE /auth/sessions/{id} ends one. Ending the current
session is allowed and is simply logging out: refusing it would be a rule
with no reason behind it, and somebody clearing every device wants this
one gone too.
Both are behind requireSession rather than the ambient auth, the same as
the API tokens. A leaked token that could list its owner's devices and end
their sessions turns a theft into a lockout.
The delete is scoped in the statement rather than checked and then run.
An id read in one step and deleted in the next is a window, and the whole
reason somebody is on this screen is that they think another person is in
their account.
The device names are a handful of substring tests, not a parsing library.
The question this answers is "is one of these me?", and for that a wrong
guess between two Chromium forks costs nothing while a dependency that has
to be kept current costs something every year. Order is the whole
correctness of it: an iPhone's user agent says Mac OS X, Edge says Chrome,
and Chrome says Safari. The raw string is sent alongside and sits in the
row's title, so anything the summary gets wrong is still visible — and
something that is not a browser at all shows its own name rather than
"Ukendt", because a CalDAV client is a real session.
Times are relative. The question is "was that me, just now?", and an
absolute timestamp makes the reader do the subtraction; past a week it
switches to a date, because "for 23 dage siden" is a number nobody can
place.
The smoke test signs in a second time in a second browser context, ends
that session from the first, and checks the other browser is really signed
out — and that this one is not.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Kristian WindandClaude Opus 5
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6b6b838167 |
feat(views): "Venter på andre", and a project you share stays yours
`assignee_id` has been on tasks since sharing was built and delegating has been possible from the drawer since yesterday. What was missing was anywhere to see it: work handed to somebody else left your lists and appeared in nothing. GET /delegated returns everything assigned to somebody who is not you, in the projects you can see, grouped by the person. Grouped on the server rather than flat, because the question is about people — "what is Anders sitting on" — and a client cannot group it itself: it would need the name behind an assignee id from a project it does not happen to have open, and there is no way to ask for that. The names come back with the tasks, so one request is one screen. The filter is a field of its own rather than a sentinel in AssigneeID. "What is on my plate" and "what have I handed over" are different questions, and one string that means an id most of the time and a magic word the rest is a field somebody eventually passes a real id to. An assignee whose account is gone is named "Ukendt" rather than dropped. Losing the row would make work disappear from the one view that exists to stop work disappearing. The sidebar entry only appears where delegating is possible at all. On an instance with one person it could never have anything in it, and a permanent empty entry is a question the sidebar keeps asking and answering "no". Building it turned up a bug in the split above it. "Projekter" and "Delt med mig" were divided on `shared`, which only means the project has more than one member — so inviting somebody to a project of your own moved it under "Delt med mig", where it lost its place in the order, stopped being draggable, and could not be filed under a group. It is divided on ownership now, which is what the two headings have always said. Sharing your own project is not the same event as somebody sharing theirs with you. The smoke test now follows the whole loop in one go: invite, accept in a second browser, assign a task to the person who just joined, and find it under their name — with the shared project still under "Projekter" on the way past. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Kristian WindandClaude Opus 5
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c14559ed0c |
feat: project groups, a month on Kommende, and dragging things where they go
The three the handoff named as next. They are one commit because they are one mechanism: all three end in something being dragged, and a drop target cannot tell what is coming without the module they now share. Groups are foldable headings over the projects in the sidebar. A table rather than a `group_name` column on the project, because a group has to be renamable in one write, has to survive being emptied, and has to remember whether it is folded — none of which a string repeated on every project row can do. Folded state lives on the row, not in localStorage. The sidebar's *width* is a property of the screen you are sitting at, which is why that one is per browser; a folded group is a statement about the group — "this is the part of my work I am not in right now" — and it is true on the laptop and on the desktop. There is nobody else's answer to disagree with either: a group belongs to exactly one person. A shared project cannot be filed. `group_id` is a column on the project row, so a member grouping somebody else's project would move it in the owner's sidebar too — the same reason `sort_order` is owner-scoped. The listing reports the column only to the owner, so a viewer is never told where somebody else keeps it. Deleting a group takes the heading and leaves the projects, and the sidebar decides where a project renders by whether its group still exists rather than by the id alone. A group deleted in another tab arrives as one event and not one per project, so for a moment the projects still name a heading that is no longer drawn — filing by the raw id would drop them out of the sidebar entirely. Kommende gains the month grid the project pages already had, behind a Liste/Kalender toggle. The two views ask for different things — seven days from today against six whole weeks around an arbitrary month — so each loads its own, and the grid reports which dates it is showing rather than having the page guess. Which view is remembered in localStorage: a month of seven columns needs room, and the answer on a phone is not the answer on a wide monitor. And a task can now be dropped on a project in the sidebar, on a day in Kommende, or on a cell in any month grid. Onto a project it is a *move*, not a field: `sort_order` belongs to the project, so it has to find a place among that project's tasks and leave its old section behind. Each drag now carries its own MIME type. `getData` is deliberately unreadable while a drag is in the air — the browser hands the payload over on drop and not before, so a page cannot read what is being dragged across it — and `dataTransfer.types` is all a target has to decide with. Deciding is the point: calling preventDefault on a drag you cannot accept is what turns "no" into a silent, wrong drop. The sidebar takes a project and a task on the same row and has to tell them apart. Two things fell out of building it. The month grid has always had one cell narrower than the other six: `.today` styled the "I dag" button in the header, and the day cell for today wears the same class, so `margin-left: auto` was shrinking a grid item to its content. It is scoped to the header now. And a project page listed whatever was in the store rather than what belonged to that project, which did not matter until a task could leave a project while you were looking at it. Covered by eight new API tests and two new smoke tests, and the smoke tests drive the drags for real — the type check they exercise exists only while a drag is in flight, so nothing else can reach it. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Kristian WindandClaude Opus 5
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c4e9e1519b |
feat(projects): drag the sidebar into the order you want
Projects have carried sort_order since the first migration and nothing ever set it, so the sidebar was ordered by creation date for good. POST /projects/reorder takes the whole list rather than one move. A person has a handful of projects, so sending the order you want is simpler to reason about than midpoints between neighbours — and it cannot run out of precision, which is the failure the task ordering has to respace a section to recover from. It also cannot land half-applied the way a sequence of individual moves can. Projects you do not own are skipped rather than refused. sort_order is a column on the project, not a preference per viewer, so a shared project sits where its owner put it and a member rearranging their own sidebar does not rearrange somebody else's. The sidebar only makes your own projects draggable, so that rule never shows up as a row that springs back. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Kristian WindandClaude Opus 5
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3f4af6c0ab |
fix: stop the app shell answering for /.well-known/
Release / Build and publish image (push) Failing after 9m56s
Adding the connector to Claude failed with "Couldn't register with Verdande's sign-in service", on a server that has no sign-in service and needs none. Claude probes /.well-known/oauth-authorization-server before connecting to an MCP server. The SPA fallback answered 200 with a page of HTML — which reads as "yes, there is an authorization server here" — so it went on to dynamic client registration and failed there instead of concluding the obvious thing, which is that this server does not use OAuth and the key in the URL is the whole credential. /.well-known/ is reserved by RFC 8615 and is never a route in this app. A 404 is the true answer, and it is also the useful one: the client stops asking and uses the URL as given. This is the third time the catch-all has caused a confusing failure by saying 200 to something that does not exist — /mcp itself was the second. The fallback should hand back the shell for routes the app might have, not for every path on the server. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Kristian WindandClaude Opus 5
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8a6e1bc39e |
feat(projects): rename, delete, and a trash you can actually reach
A project could be created and shared and never renamed or deleted. Both have worked through the API since the beginning; there was simply nothing to click. The heading is now the field — a heading that happens to be editable rather than a form that looks like one — and saves on blur, with Escape putting the old name back. Owner only, and the Inbox keeps its plain heading because it cannot be either renamed away or deleted. Deleting needed more than a button. It is soft, with thirty days to change your mind, and restoring has been possible the whole time — from an id, which is exactly what you no longer have once the project has gone from the screen. A recovery window nobody can reach is not one. So GET /trash/projects lists what you have deleted, with how many tasks went with it and how long is left, and Settings → Data has the button. Owned, not shared: a member of a project somebody else deleted has no business bringing it back, and there is a test that says so. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Kristian WindandClaude Opus 5
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0dbea0ea4b |
feat: make it possible to see which version is actually running
Release / Build and publish image (push) Failing after 9m56s
"I have updated and restarted, but I cannot tell whether it worked" is not a question the panel could answer. The version was on the startup line and in the settings page, and nowhere you can reach from outside. /healthz carries it now. That is the one endpoint answering without a session, which makes it the only way to ask the question from a terminal or from the panel itself. The "listening" line repeats it too, because that is the line the Rune's done_regex matches and therefore the one sitting at the bottom of the console after a deploy. The update notice could also never have worked. It reads GitHub's releases/latest, and this repository had only tags — a tag is not a release, and that endpoint answers 404 for a repository without any. The release workflow creates one now, after the image is pushed so a release never announces a version that failed to build. VERDANDE_UPDATE_CHECK is a Rune variable, so it can be switched on without editing the container. Still off by default: it is an outbound request, and that is a choice to make rather than a default to inherit. Rune version 1 -> 2, so the panel offers the update. Note that the check still cannot see anything while the repository is private — releases/latest is 404 anonymously, exactly as the GHCR package was. Making the repo public, or teaching the check to carry a token, is a separate decision. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Kristian WindandClaude Opus 5
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e63d852847 |
feat(mcp): let the connector address carry its own key
verdande could not be added to Claude at all. The documented setup — POST /api/v1/mcp with an Authorization header — cannot be configured from Claude's custom-connector dialog, which asks for a name, a URL and OAuth client credentials and has no field for a bearer token. The instructions described something the interface does not offer. Worse, the obvious guess failed silently in the most misleading way available: /mcp was not a route, so the SPA fallback answered 200 with a page of HTML. The connector reported a successful connection and then failed to parse the response, which reads as a broken client rather than a missing endpoint. So /mcp exists now and takes its credential in the query string, exactly as the calendar feed does and for the same reason: a client that cannot be told to send a header means the address is the credential. The request logger records paths without their query strings, so the key does not reach the log. It is deliberately outside /api/v1 and accepts the key and nothing else. Reading a session cookie here would make it a state-changing POST outside the CSRF check — a cross-site request that acts as whoever is signed in — and there is a test that fails if that ever becomes true. The API path is unchanged for anything that can send a header. The tokens page now shows the connector address next to the token it belongs to, since that is the one moment the token exists. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Kristian WindandClaude Opus 5
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68d82a1cb6 |
feat(api): personal API tokens, and let people change their own profile
docs/api.md has told people to make a token under Settings since it was written. The store has held CreateAPIToken, ListAPITokens and DeleteAPIToken since the first migration. There were no routes: nothing between the two, and no way to make one. GET, POST and DELETE under /tokens, all behind a new requireSession middleware. A bearer token is refused there with 403 even though it is accepted everywhere else — otherwise a leaked token is permanent, because whoever has it issues a second one and revoking the first changes nothing. The plaintext comes back from POST and never again; only the hash is stored, so the interface has to say so at that moment rather than offering a reveal that cannot work. PATCH /auth/me alongside it. Name, timezone and language could not be changed anywhere — not through the API and not through the interface — and an account created from an invite inherits a default timezone. That is not cosmetic: every date in the app is resolved in it, so somebody in another country had every due date land an hour out with no way to say so. The zone is validated against the running system's database rather than a list kept here, which is the same database the dates are resolved with. The email address stays read-only: it identifies the account and is what invites were sent to. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Kristian WindandClaude Opus 5
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5546e191ac |
feat(gmail,update): finish the OAuth2 flow, and tell admins about new releases
Gmail now connects. Authorisation-code flow with PKCE, the verifier kept server-side rather than in a cookie — the callback is a top-level navigation from Google, and a SameSite=Lax cookie is the kind of thing that works until a browser tightens its defaults. State is checked, the attempt expires after ten minutes, and the spent verifier is deleted rather than left at rest. Scope is gmail.readonly and the sync is one-way on purpose. Unstarring a message does not delete the task; completing the task does not touch the mailbox. Two-way would mean deciding what happens when both sides changed, and the only honest answer is a sync model far larger than the feature. The query carries newer_than:30d so connecting an account with a decade of starred mail does not create a decade of tasks. The update check is off unless the operator turns it on, asks GitHub at most every six hours, and sends nothing about the instance — no identifier, no version, no counts. A development build never reports an update: somebody running their own tree is ahead of every release, and telling them otherwise trains them to ignore the notice. Only administrators see it, because only they can act on it. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Kristian WindandClaude Opus 5
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6b19ed062d |
feat(phase5): MCP server, CalDAV, mail-to-task, Gmail settings and an AI layer
The MCP server speaks JSON-RPC over Streamable HTTP with the six tools the brief names, authenticated by a personal API token — so a connector reaches exactly what its owner reaches and there is no second identity to reason about. A failed tool call returns a tool error, not a protocol error: a model can recover from the first and can do nothing with the second. CalDAV serves VTODO, two-way, so Apple Reminders and Thunderbird can read, create and complete tasks. Clients authenticate with Basic using an API token as the password, never the account password — a client stores what it is given, and what it is given should not be able to sign in to the app. Completed tasks stay in the collection: a client that stops seeing one treats it as deleted and drops its own record of having done it. The AI layer is one interface with adapters for Anthropic, OpenAI, Google and any OpenAI-compatible endpoint. That last one is why the abstraction exists: an integration that only spoke to a hosted API would be useless to somebody running their own models. Every feature degrades to "off" when nothing is configured, and the stored API key is never returned to the settings page. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Kristian WindandClaude Opus 5
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4058ff0533 |
feat(phase2,phase4): comments, attachments, notifications, Web Push, import/export
Comments and attachments close out phase 2. Files are stored content-addressed by hash, so the path never contains anything the uploader chose — a filename is attacker-controlled text, and building a path from it is how "../" becomes a write outside the data directory. Everything downloads as application/octet-stream: an uploaded SVG served inline would run its own script on this origin with the session cookie attached. Web Push is written directly against RFC 8030/8291/8292 rather than pulled in — it is three specs' worth of well-defined crypto and about two hundred lines, and the alternatives carry a JWT and crypto stack each larger than the file. Phase 4 imports Todoist's CSV and exports it back. Todoist numbers priorities the opposite way to how it displays them — its 4 is P1 — so the two are converted rather than copied; getting it backwards silently inverts the urgency of every imported task. Nesting is positional, so the reader keeps an indent stack and the writer never sorts. The round trip is tested as the brief asks: a CSV in, out, and back produces an identical project, and two exports of one project are byte-identical. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Kristian WindandClaude Opus 5
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7e4c730049 |
feat(phase3): reminders, ICS feeds, templates and nightly backups
Reminders are absolute or relative ("10 minutes before"). A relative one
is resolved against the task in SQL, so moving a task moves its reminders
too. They are marked sent before delivery, not after: a reminder that
goes out unrecorded repeats every minute forever, which is worse than
one recorded that fails to send.
The calendar feed is a per-user token in the path, because Apple Calendar
and Google fetch with no credentials and no way to prompt for any. Tasks
go out as VTODO — the same component CalDAV will serve — and timed ones
also as VEVENT, since Google ignores VTODO entirely.
Templates store relative day offsets rather than dates, which is what
makes them reusable: an onboarding checklist is "day 1, day 3, day 14",
not three dates in March. Building a project from one is a single
transaction, so a failure cannot leave half a checklist.
Backups use SQLite's VACUUM INTO, not a file copy — a copy of a live
WAL database can miss recent writes or catch a page mid-update, and the
result looks like a database right up until it is needed. Rotation keeps
fourteen by count, not by age: a container that was off for a month must
not come back and delete every backup it has.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Kristian WindandClaude Opus 5
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4d142b2fa7 |
feat(filters): saved filters with a query language, and label management
"today & p1", "#Firma & @regnskab", "overdue | (today & assigned to: me)". The grammar is Todoist's, so the import path from it does not require relearning anything, and both languages' keywords are accepted. It compiles to parameterised SQL rather than filtering in Go: one indexed query instead of ten thousand rows crossing the boundary. No typed text is ever concatenated into the statement — this is a language people write by hand, which makes it exactly where string-building would become an injection. An expression is compiled before it is saved. A filter that cannot run is worse than none: it is discovered later, as a list that is empty for a reason nobody can see. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Kristian WindandClaude Opus 5
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12a9597919 |
feat(web): SvelteKit PWA with the Nordic design system
The interface for phase 1: sign-in and first-run setup, Today, Upcoming, project views, sharing, Cmd+K search and the keyboard shortcuts. Quick add highlights what the parser understood underneath the text as you type — a mirrored layer behind a transparent input, sliced by byte offset because the server counts bytes and JavaScript counts UTF-16 units, which disagree on exactly the Danish letters this app is full of. Every local action is optimistic and reconciled afterwards: ticking a task off strikes it through and animates it out before the request leaves, and rolls back with a message if the server disagrees. The Content-Security-Policy is computed at startup by hashing the inline scripts in the built index.html. Both of them change on every frontend build, so a hard-coded hash would go stale silently and show up only as a blank page in production. The alternative, 'unsafe-inline', would drop the one protection that makes an injected script in a task title inert. Today is derived from the store by date rather than from the ids that came back with the first request — filtering against a captured list meant a task added through quick add never appeared until a reload. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Kristian WindandClaude Opus 5
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dff86dd23d |
feat(api): projects, sections, tasks, quick add, views and live sync
Completes the MVP surface: project and section CRUD, task CRUD with sub-trees, drag-and-drop ordering, the quick-add endpoint over the natural-language parser, Today and Upcoming, search, sharing with roles, an activity log and a WebSocket for live updates. Permission checks are route middleware rather than a first line in each handler, so an endpoint is guarded by where it sits instead of by the author remembering. Anything the caller may not see answers 404, never 403 — a 403 confirms the thing exists. Visibility is enforced inside the list query, so another user's project cannot be reached by filtering or searching at it. Ordering is a float, so a drop writes one row instead of renumbering the list. When repeated drops into one gap exhaust the precision, the section is spread out again and the move retried — in a separate transaction, since the attempt that discovered the problem rolls back. The connection pool is not 1: a single connection makes the pool a lock, and a query run while an earlier result set is still open then waits for a connection it is itself holding. The store now closes its rows before querying again, and the pool leaves that mistake slow rather than fatal. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Kristian WindandClaude Opus 5
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1bb644f4d1 |
feat(api): authentication — login, two-step TOTP, invites and resets
Sessions are stored as hashes, so a database dump contains nothing that can be pasted into a browser. A login that has passed the password but not the second factor is modelled as a pending session: it expires, is revocable, and reaches exactly one endpoint. Signup is invite-only and takes the email address from the invite rather than the form, so a link cannot be redirected to somebody else. The first admin is created by an endpoint that refuses once any account exists, checked and inserted in one transaction because it is necessarily unauthenticated. Login failures and forgotten-password requests answer identically whether or not the address has an account — otherwise the form is an account-existence oracle. Password rules are a length floor and nothing else: composition rules push people towards worse passwords. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Kristian WindandClaude Opus 5
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02c8b1be61 |
feat(server): runnable binary, Rune manifest, Docker image and CI
The HTTP server serves /healthz, the API namespace and the PWA, with the frontend embedded behind a build tag so a clean checkout compiles without a Node toolchain. /healthz reads the database rather than just answering: a process that cannot reach its own data is not healthy, and a 200 there would keep a broken container in rotation. The image is distroless and static — the SQLite driver is pure Go, so CGO stays off. The Rune manifest uses keep_entrypoint because there is no shell in the image to run a startup command with, and its log watchers match the JSON log format the container actually emits. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |