Commit Graph
6 Commits
Author SHA1 Message Date
Kristian WindandClaude Opus 5 b87c9ea6e2 fix(auth): en afvist passkey sagde "forkert e-mail eller adgangskode"
Release / Build and publish image (push) Failing after 10m0s
Der er hverken en e-mail eller en adgangskode i et passkey-login. Loginet er
discoverable — enheden ved selv, hvilken konto nøglen hører til, og der bliver
ikke tastet noget. Alligevel fik en afvisning fladens generiske 401-tekst, og den
nævner begge dele.

Det sendte en person ud at lede efter en tastefejl i sin konto, der aldrig havde
været der. Det, der faktisk var sket, var at instansen var flyttet fra http til
https: en passkey hører til præcis den adresse, den blev lavet på — `RPOrigins`
bygges af `VERDANDE_BASE_URL` med skema og alt — så et login på det ene skema mod
en server, der venter det andet, kan ikke verificeres.

Beskeden siger nu det, og siger også hvor man skal kigge. Serveren har hele tiden
svaret "that key was not accepted"; det var oversættelsen i fladen, der gjorde
den til noget andet.

Aflysning bliver behandlet som før — den er ikke en fejl, og en fejl for den ville
læse som om nøglen blev afvist.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-20 15:59:34 +02:00
Kristian WindandClaude Opus 5 fe52818ab6 feat(auth): passkeys, as a way in and as a second factor
A password and a TOTP code are both shared secrets: the server keeps something
that can be stolen from it, and the person keeps something that can be talked out
of them. A passkey is neither. The private half never leaves the device, and the
signature is bound to the origin that asked for it — so a convincing copy of the
sign-in page at another address gets a signature it cannot use.

Logging in asks for no email. The device knows which account its key belongs to,
which is not only convenience: it means the sign-in page cannot be used to find out
who has an account here. A key that verified its owner is both factors at once and
completes the login; one that only proved possession still meets the TOTP step,
exactly as a password does.

The relying party id is derived from VERDANDE_BASE_URL rather than configured
separately — a second setting that has to agree with the first is one that will
one day disagree, and the failure is a login nobody can complete. An IP address is
refused up front: no browser accepts one, and without the check the server issues
a challenge happily and the browser throws SecurityError long afterwards. The list
endpoint reports whether this deployment can offer them at all, so the interface
never shows a button that cannot work.

A challenge is stored server-side, answerable exactly once, and taken rather than
read — two requests racing the same one would both succeed, which is the shape of
a replay. A sign count that has gone backwards means the credential was cloned and
is refused rather than logged.

The Go tests cover who may reach these endpoints and that challenges are spent.
The ceremony itself needs an authenticator, so the smoke test drives Chromium's
virtual one over CDP — the only thing that can tell whether the base64url
conversions are right, since one wrong byte produces a signature that will not
verify and reads as a broken key rather than a broken encoder.

That test runs at localhost in its own context while the suite stays on the
loopback address, because WebAuthn refuses an IP and resolving localhost is slow
enough here to cost the suite minutes.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-18 11:56:54 +02:00
Kristian WindandClaude Opus 5 4d8b70918b feat(i18n): the interface speaks both languages
The account has had a `locale` since the beginning and it only chose which grammar
quick add read a line with — so picking English changed nothing anybody could see,
and the field said so honestly: "Sprog i hurtig tilføjelse". It says "Sprog" now,
because it means it.

Every component goes through `t()`. Danish is the source: a key missing from
English falls through to Danish rather than to the key, because a Danish sentence
in an English screen can be read and `settings.notifications.title` cannot.

`tag()` is the single place `Intl` is asked. Before, `'da-DK'` was written into a
dozen components, and that is the half of a translation that gets left behind — an
English interface still saying "24. aug." is exactly the shape of a job half done.
There is a smoke test that switches to English and refuses to see a Danish month
name in the calendar's heading.

Colour and theme names are keys now. `colors.js` keeps its ids untouched — they
are what the database stores, and `internal/store` reads them out of that file —
but `name` is `'color.tomato'`, resolved where it is drawn.

The Inbox keeps its name. It is a project row the server creates at signup, not a
string in the interface, and it can be renamed like any other project.

Four copies of "3 hours ago" became one, in `web/src/lib/when.js`. They had
already drifted: one said "aldrig logget ind", another "aldrig", and two stopped
at days where the others carried on to a date.

Routes stay Danish. `/indstillinger`, `/projekt`, `/uddelegeret` are bookmarks and
they are in every smoke test; translating them buys nothing and costs both.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-18 09:46:08 +02:00
Kristian WindandClaude Opus 5 eaff890860 fix(forms): Safari focused none of them, and a board could not make a section
Two reports, one sentence between them: "sections have no function, because you
cannot create more than one."

`autofocus` does not work in Safari for anything inserted after the page has
loaded, and every inline form here is inserted after the page has loaded — rename
a project, add a section, name a group. In Safari they all opened with no cursor
in them and what you typed went nowhere. That does not look like a bug. It looks
like the feature does not work. `use:focusOnMount` replaces all seventeen.

And the board had no way to add a section at all. The button lived only in the
list view, which is the one place nobody looks for it: a column on a board *is* a
section, so that is where you go to make one.

Chasing this turned up a third. The task drawer's three fields save on blur, and
closing the drawer *is* a blur — the input is being unmounted and the browser
fires blur on the way out. If the task left the store in the same moment, `task`
was already null and the handler threw `Cannot read properties of null`, stopping
the page. It only became reproducible once focus actually worked.

Fields are 16px on a touch device now, whatever the component asked for. Below
16px, iOS Safari zooms in when a field takes focus and does not zoom back out —
so the whole interface is left too large and has to be pinched back by hand, once
per field. The type scale tops out at 15px, so every input in the app did it.

The sidebar's resize handle sat at `right: -3px`. An absolutely positioned child
counts towards its container's scrollable overflow, and `overflow-y: auto`
resolves the other axis to `auto` too — so those three pixels gave the whole menu
a horizontal scrollbar on every desktop, always. The account name could do it as
well: `overflow: hidden` with no `min-width: 0` cannot shrink, so the row grew
instead of ellipsing.

There is a WebKit pass in the suite now, over one test. The rest stays Chromium
on purpose — a smoke test exists to catch a build that does not work, and three
engines find the same bug three times — but focus is the exception, and it took a
person using the app to find that out.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-18 09:05:02 +02:00
Kristian WindandClaude Opus 5 34b718529c fix(auth): the two links sent by email now go somewhere
An invite has always emailed `/invite?token=…` and "Glemt adgangskode?"
has always emailed `/reset?token=…`. Neither address existed. The Go
binary serves the app shell for anything it does not recognise, the shell
found no session, and both links opened the plain sign-in form — asking an
invited person to log into an account that did not exist yet, and asking
somebody who had forgotten their password for their password.

Both APIs were finished. `POST /auth/signup` takes the invite token, reads
the email address off the invite rather than the form — so a link cannot
be redirected to somebody else — creates the account, accepts the invite
and starts the session, all in one transaction. `POST
/auth/password/reset` takes the reset token and ends every session the
account had. Nothing was missing but two pages.

They are branches of SignIn rather than screens of their own, which is
what that component already says it is for: one decision tree, so a person
is never redirected mid-authentication. The routes exist because a link
has to be an address, and each renders the same component; it reads the
token out of the URL itself.

The reset does not sign you in afterwards. The whole point of ending every
session is that somebody may have been in the account, and quietly opening
a new one here would undo the half of that which matters.

Two states that are easy to leave out, and both are reachable in one click
from an old email: a link with no token says so instead of showing a form
that cannot succeed, and a link opened while already signed in as somebody
else offers to log out rather than creating a second account for a person
who is right there in the first one.

The smoke test walks the whole invite: share a project, read the link out
of the panel that shows it when there is no mail server, open it in a
second browser context, create the account, and find the shared project in
the sidebar. A second context and not a second page — inheriting the
session would test the one case that never happens, which is what it did
on the first run.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-17 19:30:21 +02:00
Kristian WindandClaude Opus 5 12a9597919 feat(web): SvelteKit PWA with the Nordic design system
The interface for phase 1: sign-in and first-run setup, Today, Upcoming,
project views, sharing, Cmd+K search and the keyboard shortcuts.

Quick add highlights what the parser understood underneath the text as
you type — a mirrored layer behind a transparent input, sliced by byte
offset because the server counts bytes and JavaScript counts UTF-16
units, which disagree on exactly the Danish letters this app is full of.

Every local action is optimistic and reconciled afterwards: ticking a
task off strikes it through and animates it out before the request
leaves, and rolls back with a message if the server disagrees.

The Content-Security-Policy is computed at startup by hashing the inline
scripts in the built index.html. Both of them change on every frontend
build, so a hard-coded hash would go stale silently and show up only as
a blank page in production. The alternative, 'unsafe-inline', would drop
the one protection that makes an injected script in a task title inert.

Today is derived from the store by date rather than from the ids that
came back with the first request — filtering against a captured list
meant a task added through quick add never appeared until a reload.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-17 00:03:20 +02:00