The setup screen showed the secret and the otpauth URI as text and asked
you to scan — with nothing to scan. It renders the URI as a QR now, an SVG
(one dark path on a white card, so it reads in either theme) generated from
the barcode encoder already in the module graph via pquerna/otp. The secret
stays below it for a device that cannot scan.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
To huller fra sikkerhedsgennemgangen, og de er samme historie fortalt to gange:
den ene kontrol, der findes til når adgangskoden allerede er tabt, kunne omgås af
netop den, der havde adgangskoden.
**H1 — spanden blev fyldt af adgangskoden alene.** `handleLogin` nulstillede
ratebegrænseren ved hver korrekt adgangskode, *før* den så på, om der var en
andenfaktor. Det gav én, der havde kodeordet, ubegrænsede portioner på ti gæt:
log ind, få en frisk spand og en frisk ventende session, brug ti gæt på koden, log
ind igen. Med tre gyldige koder i ethvert øjeblik og tyve forespørgsler i
sekundet er det lige odds inden for en eftermiddag.
Spanden ryddes nu først, når login er *færdigt*, og der er kommet en spand mere:
koder tælles pr. konto og ikke kun pr. adresse. Adressespanden er slået af enhver
med mere end én adresse, hvilket er det almindelige — en telefon og en bærbar er
allerede to. Det, der gør en sekscifret kode sikker, er at gæt er en knap
ressource, og knapheden skal tælles imod det, der bliver angrebet.
Den ventende session får lov at leve. At afslutte den ved første forkerte ciffer
blev overvejet og valgt fra: det ville koste en, der taster ét tal forkert, sin
adgangskode igen, og det køber næsten ingenting oven i loftet pr. konto.
**M3 — et lækket token kunne tilmelde sin egen andenfaktor.** `/auth/totp/setup`
lå kun bag `requireAuth` og spurgte om ingenting, mens `disable` altid har
krævet adgangskoden: døren åbnede med et token og lukkede kun med et kodeord. Et
stjålet token kunne hente hemmeligheden, lægge den i sin egen godkender, bekræfte
den og beholde den eneste kopi af gendannelseskoderne. Ejerens næste login ville
stoppe ved en kode, de ikke havde, og de kunne ikke slå den fra uden at logge ind
først. Et tyveri bliver til et lejemål — den sætning står allerede i filen ved
siden af om passkeys, og det er den samme regel.
Nu bag `requireSession` sammen med passkeys og sessionerne, og `setup` spørger om
adgangskoden ligesom `disable`. Symmetrien er pointen: at slå den til er mindst
lige så indgribende som at slå den fra.
Og en note kan oprettes inde fra et projekt. At ligge i et projekt *er* måden en
note deles på, så det er én handling frem for to — man skulle før oprette noten
under Noter og bagefter finde projektet frem i "Del i". Ruden findes nu, også før
der er en eneste note, for ellers er der ingen knap dér, hvor man opdager at der
skal skrives noget ned.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The panel's watcher reported four 5xx today — twice from one address at
11:49, twice from another at 10:45 — and there is no way to find out what
any of them were. verdande logs the real cause of every 500, but on a Rune
the log belongs to the container and the container is replaced on every
restart. So an operator is told that something broke and given nothing to
act on, which is the worst of both: alarming and useless.
Every 500 now writes a row: what the handler was attempting in its own
words, the error it hit, the method and path, who was asking, and the
request id that ties it back to the log line for whoever still has it. The
"what" is the part a status code cannot give — "list projects" and "move
task" are the difference between a fault you can find and one you can only
count.
Written best-effort and never checked. This is the path that is already
reporting a failure, and a diagnostic that can itself fail the request
would turn one broken screen into two.
Threading the request through `internal()` and `storeError()` touched 108
call sites across 19 files, which is the price of not having had it there
from the start. It is mechanical and the compiler checked all of it.
Kept for thirty days by the nightly sweep: long enough to answer "what
happened last week", short enough that a fault loop cannot fill the volume
the tasks live on.
Read at Indstillinger → Fejl, administrators only — it carries paths,
account names and the server's own error strings. The empty state says
"Ingen fejl registreret. Det er den rigtige tilstand", because a blank
panel should not read as a broken one.
The test drops a table and asks for the endpoint that reads it: the same
code path a disk error takes, and the row that comes back has to name the
operation, the account and the request.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Two bugs with one shape: the interface confidently told you something
that was not so.
Connecting Gmail without a registered OAuth client said "Det er der
allerede." Thirteen different situations answered a plain `conflict`, and
the frontend renders that as "that already exists" — which for four of
them is not vague but wrong. An unconfigured Gmail is not a Gmail that is
already connected; a second factor that is off is not one that is on; the
Inbox is not a project that already exists somewhere else. Those four
have their own codes now, and their own sentences.
The mail-to-task address came out as todo+…@localhost. VERDANDE_SMTP_FROM
defaults to verdande@localhost and the domain was taken from it
unconditionally, so an instance with no mail server handed out an address
that looks real, can never receive anything, and gives no hint which of
the two it is. The default no longer wins over the public hostname, and
the response now carries whether a mail server exists at all — because
even with the right domain, nothing routes to it until one does.
errors.go has always claimed the code list is kept in one place "so the
frontend's mapping can be checked against it". Nothing checked it, and
the mapping was missing bad_request. Now a test reads both files and
fails on a code with no message.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Sessions are stored as hashes, so a database dump contains nothing that
can be pasted into a browser. A login that has passed the password but
not the second factor is modelled as a pending session: it expires, is
revocable, and reaches exactly one endpoint.
Signup is invite-only and takes the email address from the invite rather
than the form, so a link cannot be redirected to somebody else. The
first admin is created by an endpoint that refuses once any account
exists, checked and inserted in one transaction because it is
necessarily unauthenticated.
Login failures and forgotten-password requests answer identically
whether or not the address has an account — otherwise the form is an
account-existence oracle. Password rules are a length floor and nothing
else: composition rules push people towards worse passwords.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
