6116ed2e21bbf0e36491b75afa207683e7bb99a6
12
Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
 kristianwindandClaude Opus 5
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91671a4f97 |
feat(notes): share a note with a person, not only through a project
Until now a note was shared exactly one way: file it in a shared project, and
everyone who could read the project could read the note. That is right when the
note belongs with a body of work and wrong when it is just "let Sofie see this" —
it made you stand up a project to hand over a single page.
A note can now be shared with named people directly, at viewer or editor — the
same two roles a project membership uses, so there is one idea of a role in the
program and not two. The paths stack: a note can be loose, filed, shared with
people, or any mix, and access is the most any of them allow.
The store:
- note_shares (migration 0030): note ↔ user ↔ role, one row per person, owner
recorded. Visibility (AllNotes, and search via mayTouchNote) widens to include
notes shared directly with the reader.
- the effective role folds a direct share on top of the owner and project paths.
The rules, drawn where they protect the owner:
- read = viewer, edit text = editor, on any path.
- MOVE a note (change its project) is owner-only: an editor filing it into a
project the owner is not in would take the owner's own note away from them.
- DELETE is owner or project-editor — a direct share, however high its role,
does not reach to throwing the note away.
- SHARE and UNSHARE are the owner's alone, like a project's invitations.
- the picker is everyone on the instance (a closed, invited set) minus who is
already on the note; a made-up id and the owner themselves are refused.
The list:
- a "Delt med mig" group at the top, collapsible, that appears only when it has
something in it — the same rule Favoritter follows — so it costs nothing when
you share nothing. A shared note lives there, not also in a time bucket.
- every shared note carries a small chip in its owner's avatar colour, the
project mark's shape said for a person.
- no star or archive button on a note somebody else owns: those change the note
itself, and it is not yours to put away.
- the editor grows a "Del med personer" panel for the owner: who can see it, at
what role, and an add row drawn from the instance's other people.
The old comment in the notes footer argued against a note having an access list
of its own. That was the right call until the case it did not cover — sharing
without a project — turned out to be the one actually asked for. Updated to match.
Person now carries json tags, so a note's owner serialises as id/name/avatar_color
like every other person in the API rather than as Go field names.
Tests: a shared note reaches the other person marked and owned; a viewer reads but
cannot write; an editor writes but cannot re-share or delete; unshare removes
access and is owner-only; the candidate list excludes who is already on and the
owner; and a made-up id and self are refused. OpenAPI covers the three new routes.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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kristianwindandClaude Opus 5
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77994eff09 |
feat(security): a TOTP code can be used once
RFC 6238 says the verifier must reject a code it has already accepted: a code stays valid for its whole thirty-second window, so one seen in flight — a phishing page, a proxy, over the shoulder — could be replayed until it expired. Tasks now record the counter of the last accepted step (totp_last_step), and a login accepts a code only when its step is strictly greater. The guard is in the UPDATE, not a read-then-write, so two logins racing with the same stolen code cannot both find the old value and both proceed — exactly one moves the row. auth.TOTPStep is VerifyTOTP that also reports which step matched, walking the same one-step window; the code entered a little early or late spends the step it was issued at, not the step it was checked at, so a late-but-valid code is still single-use. Verified end to end: the same code presented to two logins in one window is accepted once and refused the second time. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Kristian WindandClaude Opus 5
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dcb71f4c14 |
feat(calendar): abonnement på flere kalendere, ICS og webcal
Release / Build and publish image (push) Failing after 10m3s
Bedt om som "abonnering af flere kalendere (ics og webcal?)". Det er også den eneste vej for en privat konto: instansens OAuth-klient er Internal, og Google afviser en konto udefra med `org_internal`, uanset hvad der ellers er sat op. **Samme tabeller.** Et abonnement er én kalender med begivenheder i, og det er præcis det, `calendars` og `calendar_events` allerede beskriver — med vinduet, farven, `shown` og hele fejemaskinen omkring sig. En tabel til ville være en anden vej til det samme sted, og to veje til ét sted er to steder at rette den dag noget om begivenheder ændrer sig. Det, der skulle laves om, var identiteten. En OAuth-konto er én pr. person og udbyder — tokenet er identiteten — mens et abonnement er én pr. adresse, og man har flere. `calendar_accounts_once` er derfor delvist nu: det holder for rækkerne uden adresse, og et andet indeks holder adresserne unikke. Delvise indekser er den ene ting, SQLite kan her, som ellers krævede en tabelombygning. **`webcal://` skrives om til `https://`.** Det er ikke en protokol, noget taler — det er en konvention, der får et skrivebord til at give adressen til kalenderprogrammet i stedet for til browseren, og alle udgivere skriver deres links sådan. At afvise den ville være at afvise folk på en teknikalitet. **Adressen gennem `safedial`, begge halvdele.** Afvist hvor den skrives ned, så den, der står med feltet, får svaret med det samme — og igen på den *opslåede* adresse hver gang den hentes, fordi et navn, der blev godkendt ved indtastningen, kan svare 127.0.0.1, når fejemaskinen kører klokken tre om natten. Det er den sætning, `internal/safedial` selv står og advarer om, og den blev skrevet efter et SSRF-fund i morges. **Hentet én gang, før den gemmes.** En adresse, der ikke kan læses, er en tastefejl langt oftere end en server, der tilfældigvis er nede, og at sige det, mens nogen står med feltet, er de to sekunder værd. Et abonnement, der lydløst aldrig fyldes, er den samme tavshed, notifikationerne havde. Læseren er ny i `internal/ics`, som hidtil kun kunne skrive. To ting, den med vilje ikke gør, står skrevet ved den: den udfolder ikke gentagelser, og den opløser ikke tidszoner. Begge dele er større end de ser ud, og begge har ét sted at høre til den dag de skal. En ting, formatet lærte: DTEND er eksklusiv for en heldagsbegivenhed. Gemmes den, som filen skriver den, dækker hver eneste helligdag også dagen efter sig. Én adresse, der fejler, stopper ikke de andre. Et abonnement er en anden persons server, og den ordinære tilstand for en anden persons server er, at den er i orden indtil en morgen hvor den ikke er. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Kristian WindandClaude Opus 5
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4aa8bd6a40 |
fix(sikkerhed): resten af gennemgangen — SSRF, tre ubegrænsede veje, og fire hemmeligheder
Release / Build and publish image (push) Failing after 9m54s
**H2 — SSRF gennem AI-udbyderens adresse.** `base_url` blev gemt uden kontrol og hentet med en almindelig klient, og udbyderens svar blev givet tilbage ordret. Det var en fungerende skanner af det interne net for enhver bruger: peg den på en vært, læs de første tre hundrede bytes af det, der svarede. På en homelab er det det meste af, hvad der er værd at nå. Nu gennem `safedial`, og svarets krop går i loggen frem for i svaret. Operatøren har stadig brug for beskeden — for en lokal model er den som regel selve problemet — så den er der, bare kun for den, der kører instansen. **M2 — Web Push havde tre.** Endepunktet blev gemt ukontrolleret og POSTet til på en tidsplan, den, der ringer, selv vælger: sæt en påmindelse et minut ude, og serveren henter adressen, hvert minut. Upserten flyttede desuden ejerskabet med `user_id = excluded.user_id`, så enhver, der kendte en andens endepunkt, kunne overtage det — offerets telefon ville få angriberens beskeder og ingen af sine egne. Og `DeletePushSubscription` havde ingen ejer-kontrol. **H3 — tre veje uden loft.** FTS-udtrykket byggede omkring halvtreds bytes pr. ord uden grænse; en søgning på en kvart megabyte blev til to megabyte MATCH-udtryk og seksogtyve sekunder inde i SQLite, mens den holdt på én af kun fire til otte forbindelser. Nogle få af dem samtidig, og databasen er utilgængelig for alle på instansen, logins inklusive. `filterquery.Parse` er kvadratisk — halvtreds tusind led er syv sekunders CPU og seksogfyrre gigabyte allokering i én forespørgsel — og havde hverken loft på antal eller på dybde. Og noteimporten læste hver fil i arkivet uden grænse: 64 MB komprimeret kan blive til seksogtres gigabyte skrevet ned på den disk, databasen ligger på. **M1 — `comment_id` blev taget på tro.** Rettighedskontrollen så på opgaven i adressen, mens filen blev hængt på den kommentar, formularen bad om. En viewer på et delt projekt kan liste dets kommentarer, så hun kunne læse et id og lægge en fil under en andens kommentar i et projekt, hun kun må læse. **M4 — fire hemmeligheder lå i klartekst i hver sikkerhedskopi.** TOTP-koden og AI-nøglen forsegles nu; begge konverterer sig selv næste gang de skrives. Kalenderfeedets og mailadressens tokens gør ikke — de slås op på deres præcise værdi og vises i fladen mere end én gang, hvilket en hash ikke kan. Det står nu skrevet i `SECURITY.md`, som påstod det modsatte. At rette det betyder, at adressen kun kan vises én gang, og det er en beslutning om, hvordan funktionen virker. Og en prøve på, at politikken overhovedet bliver sendt. Det var den, der gjorde XSS-en i nat til indsat HTML frem for kørt script, og der var ingen prøve, der rørte den — en foranstaltning, ingen prøve rører, kan forsvinde i en oprydning, uden at nogen opdager det. Målt på script-src alene: `style-src 'unsafe-inline'` står der med vilje, og en indsat stil kan gøre en side grim, ikke køre kode. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Kristian WindandClaude Opus 5
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f557d319ca |
feat(sidebar): de faste visninger kan sorteres, og rækkefølgen følger kontoen
Release / Build and publish image (push) Failing after 9m57s
I dag, Kommende, Venter og Indbakken kan trækkes i den rækkefølge, man vil have dem. På kontoen frem for i browseren: sidebjælkens bredde er en kendsgerning om skærmen, og svaret på en telefon er ikke svaret på en skærm — men hvilken rækkefølge man vil have dem i, er en kendsgerning om personen. En liste af nøgler frem for et tal pr. visning. Ukendte nøgler droppes og manglende føjes til sidst, så en visning kan tilføjes eller fjernes uden at strande nogens rækkefølge — hvilket allerede er sket én gang, da Færdige forlod menuen. To ting, prøverne fandt undervejs, og begge var mine: Rækken som trækgreb gjorde alt indeni trækbart, og sidebjælken er allerede modtager for opgaver — en opgave trukket til I dag holdt op med at lande, fordi rækken havde taget gestussen. Et lille greb tager ingenting, før man griber det. Og drop-håndteringen slugte begivenheden, før den tjekkede, om den overhovedet var en menuflytning. Migration 0019. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Kristian WindandClaude Opus 5
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ebdc8eacf2 |
feat(admin): deleting an account stops deleting other people's work
`tasks.created_by` was ON DELETE CASCADE, so retiring a colleague removed every task they had ever written — including in projects somebody else owns. The interface said so in plain words before you pressed the button, which is a warning rather than a fix. It was the last remaining way to lose other people's work by accident. SET NULL instead: the task stays and loses its author, the same shape `assignee_id` and `completed_by` already have. SQLite cannot alter a foreign key action, so the table is rebuilt — and with foreign keys on, the drop in the middle of a rebuild is a cascading delete that takes every row referencing `tasks` with it. `PRAGMA foreign_keys` is a no-op inside a transaction, so migrations now run on a connection of their own, and a migration can opt out of enforcement with `-- verdande:rebuild-tables`. `PRAGMA foreign_key_check` runs before the commit, so a rebuild that leaves a dangling reference fails the migration rather than writing it. The test fills a database at 0007, upgrades it, and counts. Without the marker it loses a task, a label link and a comment — which is exactly what it is for. The admin list now says two numbers instead of one: what disappears, and what stays behind unattributed. They are different sentences and the second is a reassurance. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Kristian WindandClaude Opus 5
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35d9e3bdac |
feat: an assignee on the row, and the activity log made visible
Release / Build and publish image (push) Failing after 10m2s
Two more things the database has been recording and the interface has
never shown.
**Who a task is waiting on, on the row.** Only when it is not you: your own
list would otherwise carry your own face on every line, which is a column
of one initial telling you nothing. The point of showing an assignee is
that it is somebody else.
That needed names, and a task carries only an `assignee_id`. `GET /people`
is the primitive: everybody you share a project with, plus yourself,
fetched once per session. Not per row, and not per project either — a list
would have to know which project each task belongs to before it could ask
for that project's members. Deliberately *not* the instance's user list,
which is `/users` and administrators only: a task list has no business
enumerating everybody with an account here.
It sits first in the meta line, because who changes what the rest of the
line means — a date on somebody else's task is their deadline, not yours.
**And the activity log.** Nineteen kinds of entry have been written since
the beginning — every project, section, member, task and comment event —
and `GET /projects/{id}/activity` has answered honestly the whole time with
nothing on the other end. There is a Historik panel on the project now,
loaded when it is opened rather than with the page, and the event keys
become Danish in exactly one place. An unknown key falls through to itself
rather than being hidden: a build that records something this table has not
learned should still show that it happened.
One test assertion had to change, and it is worth saying why. It matched
"males inden fredag" against a row whose title is "males inden" — quick add
read "fredag" as the due date — so it was really matching the title
concatenated with the metadata beside it. Putting the assignee between them
broke it. The assertion now names the task's own text.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Kristian WindandClaude Opus 5
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e8ebd0fa78 |
feat(admin): a page for who is on the instance, and how somebody else gets on it
Release / Build and publish image (push) Failing after 10m0s
The README has promised "internal users are created by an admin" since the beginning and there was no such thing. There are exactly two ways an account has ever come into existence: the first admin at setup, and somebody accepting an invite to a project. So the only way to add a person was to share a project with them first. The store has been ready the whole time. CreateInvite already documents that "projectID may be empty, which invites somebody to the instance rather than to a particular project", and AcceptInvite already has the branch that grants no membership when there is none. requireAdmin has existed in the middleware and was used nowhere. This wires those three together and puts a page on them. An invite rather than an account with a password the administrator picks. A password typed here would be known to two people before it was ever used, and would then have to travel to the second one by some channel nobody has thought about. No name is asked for either — the signup form asks the person, and a name an administrator guesses is a name somebody has to correct. Two refusals keep the instance administrable: the last administrator cannot be demoted or deleted, and nobody can delete the account they are signed in as. Both are enforced on the server; the interface simply does not draw the buttons on your own row, because a button whose only purpose is to be refused wastes a click to teach a rule. The last-admin refusal gets its own error code, because "that already exists" is not what happened and this is the one refusal a person needs explained. Deleting an account is the only hard delete in this database, and building the confirmation is what turned up how wide it goes. `projects.owner_id` cascades, which is expected. But `tasks.created_by` cascades too — so removing a colleague deletes every task they ever wrote, including in projects somebody else owns. The count in the list says so, and the confirmation says it in words. Changing that to ON DELETE SET NULL, so the work stays and loses its author, means rebuilding the tasks table and its FTS triggers: worth doing, not worth doing quietly while adding a screen. It is written down in the store instead. Pending invites are listed and can be withdrawn. Only the token's hash is stored, so a link sent to the wrong address cannot be looked up and resent — withdrawing it is the only way to stop it before it expires. Six API tests for the guards and the counts, and two smoke tests: the whole loop from invite to a second browser creating the account and appearing in the list as somebody who is not an administrator, and the absence of buttons on your own row. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Kristian WindandClaude Opus 5
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6b6b838167 |
feat(views): "Venter på andre", and a project you share stays yours
`assignee_id` has been on tasks since sharing was built and delegating has been possible from the drawer since yesterday. What was missing was anywhere to see it: work handed to somebody else left your lists and appeared in nothing. GET /delegated returns everything assigned to somebody who is not you, in the projects you can see, grouped by the person. Grouped on the server rather than flat, because the question is about people — "what is Anders sitting on" — and a client cannot group it itself: it would need the name behind an assignee id from a project it does not happen to have open, and there is no way to ask for that. The names come back with the tasks, so one request is one screen. The filter is a field of its own rather than a sentinel in AssigneeID. "What is on my plate" and "what have I handed over" are different questions, and one string that means an id most of the time and a magic word the rest is a field somebody eventually passes a real id to. An assignee whose account is gone is named "Ukendt" rather than dropped. Losing the row would make work disappear from the one view that exists to stop work disappearing. The sidebar entry only appears where delegating is possible at all. On an instance with one person it could never have anything in it, and a permanent empty entry is a question the sidebar keeps asking and answering "no". Building it turned up a bug in the split above it. "Projekter" and "Delt med mig" were divided on `shared`, which only means the project has more than one member — so inviting somebody to a project of your own moved it under "Delt med mig", where it lost its place in the order, stopped being draggable, and could not be filed under a group. It is divided on ownership now, which is what the two headings have always said. Sharing your own project is not the same event as somebody sharing theirs with you. The smoke test now follows the whole loop in one go: invite, accept in a second browser, assign a task to the person who just joined, and find it under their name — with the shared project still under "Projekter" on the way past. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Kristian WindandClaude Opus 5
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68d82a1cb6 |
feat(api): personal API tokens, and let people change their own profile
docs/api.md has told people to make a token under Settings since it was written. The store has held CreateAPIToken, ListAPITokens and DeleteAPIToken since the first migration. There were no routes: nothing between the two, and no way to make one. GET, POST and DELETE under /tokens, all behind a new requireSession middleware. A bearer token is refused there with 403 even though it is accepted everywhere else — otherwise a leaked token is permanent, because whoever has it issues a second one and revoking the first changes nothing. The plaintext comes back from POST and never again; only the hash is stored, so the interface has to say so at that moment rather than offering a reveal that cannot work. PATCH /auth/me alongside it. Name, timezone and language could not be changed anywhere — not through the API and not through the interface — and an account created from an invite inherits a default timezone. That is not cosmetic: every date in the app is resolved in it, so somebody in another country had every due date land an hour out with no way to say so. The zone is validated against the running system's database rather than a list kept here, which is the same database the dates are resolved with. The email address stays read-only: it identifies the account and is what invites were sent to. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Kristian WindandClaude Opus 5
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7e4c730049 |
feat(phase3): reminders, ICS feeds, templates and nightly backups
Reminders are absolute or relative ("10 minutes before"). A relative one
is resolved against the task in SQL, so moving a task moves its reminders
too. They are marked sent before delivery, not after: a reminder that
goes out unrecorded repeats every minute forever, which is worse than
one recorded that fails to send.
The calendar feed is a per-user token in the path, because Apple Calendar
and Google fetch with no credentials and no way to prompt for any. Tasks
go out as VTODO — the same component CalDAV will serve — and timed ones
also as VEVENT, since Google ignores VTODO entirely.
Templates store relative day offsets rather than dates, which is what
makes them reusable: an onboarding checklist is "day 1, day 3, day 14",
not three dates in March. Building a project from one is a single
transaction, so a failure cannot leave half a checklist.
Backups use SQLite's VACUUM INTO, not a file copy — a copy of a live
WAL database can miss recent writes or catch a page mid-update, and the
result looks like a database right up until it is needed. Rotation keeps
fourteen by count, not by age: a container that was off for a month must
not come back and delete every backup it has.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Kristian WindandClaude Opus 5
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1bb644f4d1 |
feat(api): authentication — login, two-step TOTP, invites and resets
Sessions are stored as hashes, so a database dump contains nothing that can be pasted into a browser. A login that has passed the password but not the second factor is modelled as a pending session: it expires, is revocable, and reaches exactly one endpoint. Signup is invite-only and takes the email address from the invite rather than the form, so a link cannot be redirected to somebody else. The first admin is created by an endpoint that refuses once any account exists, checked and inserted in one transaction because it is necessarily unauthenticated. Login failures and forgotten-password requests answer identically whether or not the address has an account — otherwise the form is an account-existence oracle. Password rules are a length floor and nothing else: composition rules push people towards worse passwords. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |