A password and a TOTP code are both shared secrets: the server keeps something
that can be stolen from it, and the person keeps something that can be talked out
of them. A passkey is neither. The private half never leaves the device, and the
signature is bound to the origin that asked for it — so a convincing copy of the
sign-in page at another address gets a signature it cannot use.
Logging in asks for no email. The device knows which account its key belongs to,
which is not only convenience: it means the sign-in page cannot be used to find out
who has an account here. A key that verified its owner is both factors at once and
completes the login; one that only proved possession still meets the TOTP step,
exactly as a password does.
The relying party id is derived from VERDANDE_BASE_URL rather than configured
separately — a second setting that has to agree with the first is one that will
one day disagree, and the failure is a login nobody can complete. An IP address is
refused up front: no browser accepts one, and without the check the server issues
a challenge happily and the browser throws SecurityError long afterwards. The list
endpoint reports whether this deployment can offer them at all, so the interface
never shows a button that cannot work.
A challenge is stored server-side, answerable exactly once, and taken rather than
read — two requests racing the same one would both succeed, which is the shape of
a replay. A sign count that has gone backwards means the credential was cloned and
is refused rather than logged.
The Go tests cover who may reach these endpoints and that challenges are spent.
The ceremony itself needs an authenticator, so the smoke test drives Chromium's
virtual one over CDP — the only thing that can tell whether the base64url
conversions are right, since one wrong byte produces a signature that will not
verify and reads as a broken key rather than a broken encoder.
That test runs at localhost in its own context while the suite stays on the
loopback address, because WebAuthn refuses an IP and resolving localhost is slow
enough here to cost the suite minutes.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
`last_seen_at` has been written on every request since sessions existed —
throttled to once a minute, deliberately, so a list could one day say
"denne enhed, lige nu" — and nothing has ever read it. The store even had
ListSessions. What was missing was two routes and a panel.
GET /auth/sessions lists them, most recently used first, with the current
one marked so nobody has to work out which row is the browser they are
reading it in. DELETE /auth/sessions/{id} ends one. Ending the current
session is allowed and is simply logging out: refusing it would be a rule
with no reason behind it, and somebody clearing every device wants this
one gone too.
Both are behind requireSession rather than the ambient auth, the same as
the API tokens. A leaked token that could list its owner's devices and end
their sessions turns a theft into a lockout.
The delete is scoped in the statement rather than checked and then run.
An id read in one step and deleted in the next is a window, and the whole
reason somebody is on this screen is that they think another person is in
their account.
The device names are a handful of substring tests, not a parsing library.
The question this answers is "is one of these me?", and for that a wrong
guess between two Chromium forks costs nothing while a dependency that has
to be kept current costs something every year. Order is the whole
correctness of it: an iPhone's user agent says Mac OS X, Edge says Chrome,
and Chrome says Safari. The raw string is sent alongside and sits in the
row's title, so anything the summary gets wrong is still visible — and
something that is not a browser at all shows its own name rather than
"Ukendt", because a CalDAV client is a real session.
Times are relative. The question is "was that me, just now?", and an
absolute timestamp makes the reader do the subtraction; past a week it
switches to a date, because "for 23 dage siden" is a number nobody can
place.
The smoke test signs in a second time in a second browser context, ends
that session from the first, and checks the other browser is really signed
out — and that this one is not.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
authenticate() cannot tell "no such session" from "the session lookup
failed" on its own — both arrive as an error. Answering 401 for both
meant a disk or file-permission problem presented as every session
ending at once: the frontend clears its state and shows the sign-in
screen to everybody, and the logs record a wave of failed logins rather
than the fault.
Now only a missing or unknown credential is 401. Anything else is a 500
and is logged as what it is.
Found while writing the smoke tests, where a deleted database file
produced SQLITE_CANTOPEN on the connections that had not been opened
yet — so most requests succeeded and a few reported the user as signed
out, which reads exactly like a flaky auth bug.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Gmail now connects. Authorisation-code flow with PKCE, the verifier kept
server-side rather than in a cookie — the callback is a top-level
navigation from Google, and a SameSite=Lax cookie is the kind of thing
that works until a browser tightens its defaults. State is checked, the
attempt expires after ten minutes, and the spent verifier is deleted
rather than left at rest.
Scope is gmail.readonly and the sync is one-way on purpose. Unstarring a
message does not delete the task; completing the task does not touch the
mailbox. Two-way would mean deciding what happens when both sides
changed, and the only honest answer is a sync model far larger than the
feature. The query carries newer_than:30d so connecting an account with
a decade of starred mail does not create a decade of tasks.
The update check is off unless the operator turns it on, asks GitHub at
most every six hours, and sends nothing about the instance — no
identifier, no version, no counts. A development build never reports an
update: somebody running their own tree is ahead of every release, and
telling them otherwise trains them to ignore the notice. Only
administrators see it, because only they can act on it.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Completes the MVP surface: project and section CRUD, task CRUD with
sub-trees, drag-and-drop ordering, the quick-add endpoint over the
natural-language parser, Today and Upcoming, search, sharing with roles,
an activity log and a WebSocket for live updates.
Permission checks are route middleware rather than a first line in each
handler, so an endpoint is guarded by where it sits instead of by the
author remembering. Anything the caller may not see answers 404, never
403 — a 403 confirms the thing exists. Visibility is enforced inside the
list query, so another user's project cannot be reached by filtering or
searching at it.
Ordering is a float, so a drop writes one row instead of renumbering the
list. When repeated drops into one gap exhaust the precision, the
section is spread out again and the move retried — in a separate
transaction, since the attempt that discovered the problem rolls back.
The connection pool is not 1: a single connection makes the pool a lock,
and a query run while an earlier result set is still open then waits for
a connection it is itself holding. The store now closes its rows before
querying again, and the pool leaves that mistake slow rather than fatal.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Sessions are stored as hashes, so a database dump contains nothing that
can be pasted into a browser. A login that has passed the password but
not the second factor is modelled as a pending session: it expires, is
revocable, and reaches exactly one endpoint.
Signup is invite-only and takes the email address from the invite rather
than the form, so a link cannot be redirected to somebody else. The
first admin is created by an endpoint that refuses once any account
exists, checked and inserted in one transaction because it is
necessarily unauthenticated.
Login failures and forgotten-password requests answer identically
whether or not the address has an account — otherwise the form is an
account-existence oracle. Password rules are a length floor and nothing
else: composition rules push people towards worse passwords.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
