The setup screen showed the secret and the otpauth URI as text and asked
you to scan — with nothing to scan. It renders the URI as a QR now, an SVG
(one dark path on a white card, so it reads in either theme) generated from
the barcode encoder already in the module graph via pquerna/otp. The secret
stays below it for a device that cannot scan.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
RFC 6238 says the verifier must reject a code it has already accepted: a code
stays valid for its whole thirty-second window, so one seen in flight — a
phishing page, a proxy, over the shoulder — could be replayed until it expired.
Tasks now record the counter of the last accepted step (totp_last_step), and a
login accepts a code only when its step is strictly greater. The guard is in the
UPDATE, not a read-then-write, so two logins racing with the same stolen code
cannot both find the old value and both proceed — exactly one moves the row.
auth.TOTPStep is VerifyTOTP that also reports which step matched, walking the
same one-step window; the code entered a little early or late spends the step it
was issued at, not the step it was checked at, so a late-but-valid code is still
single-use. Verified end to end: the same code presented to two logins in one
window is accepted once and refused the second time.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
A password and a TOTP code are both shared secrets: the server keeps something
that can be stolen from it, and the person keeps something that can be talked out
of them. A passkey is neither. The private half never leaves the device, and the
signature is bound to the origin that asked for it — so a convincing copy of the
sign-in page at another address gets a signature it cannot use.
Logging in asks for no email. The device knows which account its key belongs to,
which is not only convenience: it means the sign-in page cannot be used to find out
who has an account here. A key that verified its owner is both factors at once and
completes the login; one that only proved possession still meets the TOTP step,
exactly as a password does.
The relying party id is derived from VERDANDE_BASE_URL rather than configured
separately — a second setting that has to agree with the first is one that will
one day disagree, and the failure is a login nobody can complete. An IP address is
refused up front: no browser accepts one, and without the check the server issues
a challenge happily and the browser throws SecurityError long afterwards. The list
endpoint reports whether this deployment can offer them at all, so the interface
never shows a button that cannot work.
A challenge is stored server-side, answerable exactly once, and taken rather than
read — two requests racing the same one would both succeed, which is the shape of
a replay. A sign count that has gone backwards means the credential was cloned and
is refused rather than logged.
The Go tests cover who may reach these endpoints and that challenges are spent.
The ceremony itself needs an authenticator, so the smoke test drives Chromium's
virtual one over CDP — the only thing that can tell whether the base64url
conversions are right, since one wrong byte produces a signature that will not
verify and reads as a broken key rather than a broken encoder.
That test runs at localhost in its own context while the suite stays on the
loopback address, because WebAuthn refuses an IP and resolving localhost is slow
enough here to cost the suite minutes.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The HTTP server serves /healthz, the API namespace and the PWA, with the
frontend embedded behind a build tag so a clean checkout compiles without
a Node toolchain. /healthz reads the database rather than just answering:
a process that cannot reach its own data is not healthy, and a 200 there
would keep a broken container in rotation.
The image is distroless and static — the SQLite driver is pure Go, so
CGO stays off. The Rune manifest uses keep_entrypoint because there is
no shell in the image to run a startup command with, and its log watchers
match the JSON log format the container actually emits.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Password hashes are self-describing PHC strings, so the cost parameters
can be raised later without locking anyone out: NeedsRehash reports which
hashes to upgrade at the next login, when the plaintext is briefly at hand.
Session, invite, reset and API tokens are stored only as SHA-256 hashes;
the plaintext exists once, in the link or the reply. Unsalted is correct
here and only here — the input is 256 bits of randomness that has to be
found by value in a WHERE clause.
feat(store): project roles with viewer/editor/owner and explicit denial
Roles are strictly ordered so every check is "at least X". Access to a
task is access to its project: being the assignee or the author confers
nothing, or removing someone from a project would leave them holding
tasks inside it. Checks take a Querier so they can run in the same
transaction as the write they guard.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
