feat(admin): what has been done on this server, across every project

The other half of the error log. That one is what broke; this is what was done,
and nobody could ask it: `ListActivity` takes one project id, and an
administrator is not necessarily a member of the project they need to look into.

Paged with a keyset cursor rather than an offset. The log is written to
constantly and read rarely, so a page fetched a minute after the one before it
would be shifted by everything written in between — one row shown twice and the
row behind it skipped, which is the single failure an audit log must not have.
Both halves of the cursor matter: the log is written in whole seconds, so a
timestamp alone cannot separate two rows written in the same one.

Migration 0009 makes `activity.user_id` SET NULL for the same reason 0008 did it
to `created_by`. A log whose rows vanish with the account they describe answers
"what has happened here" with everything except the part somebody had a reason to
remove. `project_id` keeps cascading on purpose: the trash is the undo, and past
it the deletion was deliberate.

The event names moved to `web/src/lib/events.js`, because two surfaces read the
same log now and two copies of nineteen strings is two places for them to drift.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
Kristian Wind
2026-08-18 09:04:12 +02:00
co-authored by Claude Opus 5
parent ebdc8eacf2
commit 85f7b2488d
10 changed files with 996 additions and 56 deletions
+111
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,111 @@
package httpapi
import (
"net/http"
"strconv"
"strings"
"time"
"github.com/kristianwind/verdande/internal/store"
)
// What has happened on this server, across every project.
//
// The per-project history under /projects/{id}/activity is the same rows read by
// the people who work in that project. This is the administrator's version of the
// question, and it is a different one: an administrator is not necessarily a member
// of the project they need to look into, and "which account did that" cannot be
// asked one project at a time.
//
// It sits beside the error log for a reason. That one is the half about what broke;
// this is the half about what was done, and an instance had only ever had the first.
type auditEntryJSON struct {
ID string `json:"id"`
At string `json:"at"`
ProjectID string `json:"project_id"`
ProjectName string `json:"project_name"`
TaskID string `json:"task_id,omitempty"`
// UserID and UserName are absent when the account has been deleted. The row
// stays — an audit log that lost its rows when somebody left would be missing
// exactly the part worth keeping.
UserID string `json:"user_id,omitempty"`
UserName string `json:"user_name,omitempty"`
Event string `json:"event"`
Payload map[string]any `json:"payload,omitempty"`
}
func (s *Server) handleAuditLog(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
q := r.URL.Query()
f := store.AuditFilter{
UserID: q.Get("user_id"),
ProjectID: q.Get("project_id"),
Event: q.Get("event"),
Limit: parseLimit(q.Get("limit"), 100, 500),
}
if cursor := q.Get("before"); cursor != "" {
at, id, ok := parseAuditCursor(cursor)
if !ok {
writeError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, CodeBadRequest,
"before must be <unix>:<id>, as next_cursor returns it")
return
}
f.BeforeAt, f.BeforeID = at, id
}
entries, err := s.db.ListAuditLog(r.Context(), f)
if err != nil {
s.internal(w, r, "list audit log", err)
return
}
out := make([]auditEntryJSON, 0, len(entries))
for _, a := range entries {
out = append(out, auditEntryJSON{
ID: a.ID, At: a.CreatedAt.Format(time.RFC3339),
ProjectID: a.ProjectID, ProjectName: a.ProjectName, TaskID: a.TaskID,
UserID: a.UserID, UserName: a.UserName, Event: a.Event, Payload: a.Payload,
})
}
body := map[string]any{"activity": out}
// A cursor only when the page was full. A short page is the end of the log, and
// a cursor there invites one more request that can only come back empty.
if len(entries) == f.Limit && f.Limit > 0 {
last := entries[len(entries)-1]
body["next_cursor"] = strconv.FormatInt(last.CreatedAt.Unix(), 10) + ":" + last.ID
}
writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, body)
}
// handleAuditEvents is what the event filter is drawn from: the names that occur,
// with counts. Offered rather than typed — "member.role_changed" is an internal
// vocabulary, and a text field for it is a field that returns nothing until you
// have read the source.
func (s *Server) handleAuditEvents(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
events, err := s.db.AuditEvents(r.Context())
if err != nil {
s.internal(w, r, "list audit events", err)
return
}
out := make([]map[string]any, 0, len(events))
for _, e := range events {
out = append(out, map[string]any{"event": e.Event, "count": e.Count})
}
writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, map[string]any{"events": out})
}
// parseAuditCursor reads "<unix>:<id>" — the pair the keyset walk needs. Both
// halves are required: a cursor carrying only a timestamp cannot separate two rows
// written in the same second, which is the case it exists for.
func parseAuditCursor(s string) (int64, string, bool) {
at, id, found := strings.Cut(s, ":")
if !found || id == "" {
return 0, "", false
}
unix, err := strconv.ParseInt(at, 10, 64)
if err != nil || unix <= 0 {
return 0, "", false
}
return unix, id, true
}
+264
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,264 @@
package httpapi
import (
"fmt"
"net/http"
"testing"
)
// The point of the instance-wide log is that it crosses projects the caller is not
// a member of. The per-project endpoint cannot answer this question, and an
// administrator asking "what has happened on this server" was previously told to
// go and look in each project they happen to belong to.
func TestTheAuditLogCrossesProjectsTheAdminIsNotInAllOfThem(t *testing.T) {
ts := newTestServer(t)
ts.bootstrap(t)
other := ts.newUser(t, "anden@example.dk", "Anden")
// A project the administrator is not a member of.
_, theirs := other.do(t, "POST", "/api/v1/projects", map[string]any{"name": "Deres eget"})
theirID := theirs["id"].(string)
other.do(t, "POST", "/api/v1/tasks", map[string]any{
"content": "noget i deres eget", "project_id": theirID,
})
// The administrator cannot read that project's own history at all.
if resp, _ := ts.do(t, "GET", "/api/v1/projects/"+theirID+"/activity", nil); resp.StatusCode != http.StatusNotFound {
t.Fatalf("a project the admin is not in: status %d, want 404", resp.StatusCode)
}
// The instance log has it.
resp, body := ts.do(t, "GET", "/api/v1/activity", nil)
if resp.StatusCode != http.StatusOK {
t.Fatalf("audit log: status %d", resp.StatusCode)
}
entries, _ := body["activity"].([]any)
var found map[string]any
for _, raw := range entries {
e := raw.(map[string]any)
if e["project_id"] == theirID && e["event"] == "task.created" {
found = e
}
}
if found == nil {
t.Fatalf("nothing from a project the admin is not in: %v", entries)
}
if found["project_name"] != "Deres eget" {
t.Errorf("project_name = %v — a row that does not name its project says nothing",
found["project_name"])
}
if found["user_name"] != "Anden" {
t.Errorf("user_name = %v", found["user_name"])
}
}
// Administrators only, and sessions only. An audit log readable with a bearer token
// would let a stolen token read the record of the theft — and of everything else on
// the instance.
func TestTheAuditLogIsAdminsOnlyAndSessionsOnly(t *testing.T) {
ts := newTestServer(t)
ts.bootstrap(t)
other := ts.newUser(t, "anden@example.dk", "Anden")
for _, path := range []string{"/api/v1/activity", "/api/v1/activity/events"} {
if resp, _ := other.do(t, "GET", path, nil); resp.StatusCode != http.StatusForbidden {
t.Errorf("%s as an ordinary user: status %d, want 403", path, resp.StatusCode)
}
}
admin, err := ts.db.UserByEmail(t.Context(), "kristian@example.dk")
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
token := ts.apiToken(t, admin.ID)
for _, path := range []string{"/api/v1/activity", "/api/v1/activity/events"} {
req, _ := http.NewRequest("GET", ts.URL+path, nil)
req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer "+token)
resp, err := (&http.Client{}).Do(req)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
resp.Body.Close()
if resp.StatusCode != http.StatusForbidden {
t.Errorf("%s with an admin's API token: status %d, want 403", path, resp.StatusCode)
}
}
}
// The cursor is keyed on (created_at, id) because the log is written in whole
// seconds. A page boundary that landed inside a busy second would, with a
// timestamp-only cursor, either repeat those rows or skip them — and an audit log
// that skips rows is worse than no audit log.
func TestTheAuditLogPagesWithoutRepeatingOrSkipping(t *testing.T) {
ts := newTestServer(t)
ts.bootstrap(t)
_, project := ts.do(t, "POST", "/api/v1/projects", map[string]any{"name": "Meget"})
projectID := project["id"].(string)
// Written as fast as the loop goes, so they share timestamps.
const written = 25
for i := range written {
ts.do(t, "POST", "/api/v1/tasks", map[string]any{
"content": fmt.Sprintf("opgave %d", i), "project_id": projectID,
})
}
seen := map[string]bool{}
cursor := ""
for page := 0; page < 20; page++ {
path := "/api/v1/activity?limit=4"
if cursor != "" {
path += "&before=" + cursor
}
resp, body := ts.do(t, "GET", path, nil)
if resp.StatusCode != http.StatusOK {
t.Fatalf("page %d: status %d", page, resp.StatusCode)
}
entries, _ := body["activity"].([]any)
for _, raw := range entries {
id := raw.(map[string]any)["id"].(string)
if seen[id] {
t.Fatalf("row %s came back on two pages", id)
}
seen[id] = true
}
next, _ := body["next_cursor"].(string)
if next == "" {
break
}
if next == cursor {
t.Fatalf("the cursor did not move: %s", next)
}
cursor = next
}
// Everything that was written is in the walk exactly once: the task creations,
// plus the project creation.
if len(seen) != written+1 {
t.Errorf("the walk saw %d rows, want %d — a page boundary lost some",
len(seen), written+1)
}
}
// The filters, and the list the event filter is drawn from.
func TestTheAuditLogFiltersAndListsItsEvents(t *testing.T) {
ts := newTestServer(t)
ts.bootstrap(t)
other := ts.newUser(t, "anden@example.dk", "Anden")
otherUser, err := ts.db.UserByEmail(t.Context(), "anden@example.dk")
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
_, mine := ts.do(t, "POST", "/api/v1/projects", map[string]any{"name": "Mit"})
mineID := mine["id"].(string)
ts.do(t, "POST", "/api/v1/tasks", map[string]any{"content": "min", "project_id": mineID})
_, theirs := other.do(t, "POST", "/api/v1/projects", map[string]any{"name": "Deres"})
theirID := theirs["id"].(string)
other.do(t, "POST", "/api/v1/tasks", map[string]any{"content": "deres", "project_id": theirID})
_, byUser := ts.do(t, "GET", "/api/v1/activity?user_id="+otherUser.ID, nil)
for _, raw := range byUser["activity"].([]any) {
if got := raw.(map[string]any)["user_id"]; got != otherUser.ID {
t.Errorf("user_id filter returned a row by %v", got)
}
}
if len(byUser["activity"].([]any)) == 0 {
t.Error("the user filter returned nothing")
}
_, byProject := ts.do(t, "GET", "/api/v1/activity?project_id="+mineID, nil)
for _, raw := range byProject["activity"].([]any) {
if got := raw.(map[string]any)["project_id"]; got != mineID {
t.Errorf("project_id filter returned a row from %v", got)
}
}
_, byEvent := ts.do(t, "GET", "/api/v1/activity?event=project.created", nil)
rows := byEvent["activity"].([]any)
if len(rows) != 2 {
t.Errorf("event filter found %d project.created rows, want 2", len(rows))
}
for _, raw := range rows {
if got := raw.(map[string]any)["event"]; got != "project.created" {
t.Errorf("event filter returned %v", got)
}
}
// And the vocabulary the filter is built from.
_, events := ts.do(t, "GET", "/api/v1/activity/events", nil)
counts := map[string]float64{}
for _, raw := range events["events"].([]any) {
e := raw.(map[string]any)
counts[e["event"].(string)] = e["count"].(float64)
}
if counts["project.created"] != 2 || counts["task.created"] != 2 {
t.Errorf("event counts = %v", counts)
}
// A malformed cursor is a 400, not a silent first page: paging that quietly
// restarts is how an audit walk reads the same rows forever.
if resp, _ := ts.do(t, "GET", "/api/v1/activity?before=igår", nil); resp.StatusCode != http.StatusBadRequest {
t.Errorf("a malformed cursor: status %d, want 400", resp.StatusCode)
}
}
// A deleted account leaves its trail behind. This is the reason migration 0009
// exists: an audit log that lost its rows when somebody left would be missing
// exactly the part worth keeping.
func TestTheAuditLogOutlivesTheAccountItDescribes(t *testing.T) {
ts := newTestServer(t)
ts.bootstrap(t)
other := ts.newUser(t, "anden@example.dk", "Anden")
otherUser, err := ts.db.UserByEmail(t.Context(), "anden@example.dk")
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
// In a project that outlives them, so the row is not carried off by the
// project cascade instead.
_, mine := ts.do(t, "POST", "/api/v1/projects", map[string]any{"name": "Fælles"})
sharedID := mine["id"].(string)
ts.do(t, "POST", "/api/v1/projects/"+sharedID+"/invites", map[string]any{
"email": "anden@example.dk", "role": "editor",
})
other.do(t, "POST", "/api/v1/tasks", map[string]any{
"content": "deres bidrag", "project_id": sharedID,
})
_, before := ts.do(t, "GET", "/api/v1/activity?user_id="+otherUser.ID+"&event=task.created", nil)
if len(before["activity"].([]any)) != 1 {
t.Fatalf("expected one row before the delete: %v", before["activity"])
}
if resp, _ := ts.do(t, "DELETE", "/api/v1/users/"+otherUser.ID, nil); resp.StatusCode != http.StatusNoContent {
t.Fatalf("delete: status %d", resp.StatusCode)
}
_, after := ts.do(t, "GET", "/api/v1/activity?project_id="+sharedID+"&event=task.created", nil)
rows := after["activity"].([]any)
if len(rows) != 1 {
t.Fatalf("the row went with the account: %v", rows)
}
row := rows[0].(map[string]any)
if _, ok := row["user_id"]; ok {
t.Errorf("user_id is still there after the account went: %v", row["user_id"])
}
if _, ok := row["user_name"]; ok {
t.Errorf("user_name is still there after the account went: %v", row["user_name"])
}
// And the project's own history still shows it, rather than dropping the row
// on an inner join to a user that is gone.
_, project := ts.do(t, "GET", "/api/v1/projects/"+sharedID+"/activity", nil)
var kept int
for _, raw := range project["activity"].([]any) {
if raw.(map[string]any)["event"] == "task.created" {
kept++
}
}
if kept != 1 {
t.Errorf("the project history dropped the authorless row: %d", kept)
}
}
+23
View File
@@ -144,6 +144,7 @@ func New(cfg *config.Config, db *store.DB, log *slog.Logger, web fs.FS) *Server
r.Use(s.requireAuth)
r.Get("/me", s.handleMe)
r.Patch("/me", s.handleUpdateProfile)
r.Put("/sidebar-sections", s.handleSetSidebarSections)
r.Post("/logout", s.handleLogout)
r.Post("/password/change", s.handleChangePassword)
r.Post("/totp/setup", s.handleTOTPSetup)
@@ -236,6 +237,17 @@ func New(cfg *config.Config, db *store.DB, log *slog.Logger, web fs.FS) *Server
r.Delete("/", s.handleDisconnectGmail)
r.Post("/authorize", s.handleGmailAuthorize)
r.Post("/sync", s.handleGmailSyncNow)
// The OAuth client itself is the instance's registration with
// Google, not anybody's mailbox — so unlike everything above it, it
// is administrators only, and behind a session as well: a leaked
// token must not be able to read or replace this instance's
// identity to Google.
r.Group(func(r chi.Router) {
r.Use(s.requireSession, s.requireAdmin)
r.Get("/client", s.handleGetGmailClient)
r.Put("/client", s.handleSetGmailClient)
})
})
r.Route("/import", func(r chi.Router) {
@@ -306,6 +318,17 @@ func New(cfg *config.Config, db *store.DB, log *slog.Logger, web fs.FS) *Server
r.Group(func(r chi.Router) {
r.Use(s.requireSession, s.requireAdmin)
r.Get("/errors", s.handleListErrors)
// A backup file is a complete copy of the database, so this whole
// group is sessions-only as well as administrators-only: a leaked
// token must not be able to download everybody's data.
r.Get("/backups", s.handleListBackups)
r.Post("/backups", s.handleRunBackup)
r.Get("/backups/{backupID}", s.handleDownloadBackup)
// The instance-wide history. Above the per-project one in every
// sense: it crosses projects the caller is not a member of, which
// is the whole reason it is here and not there.
r.Get("/activity", s.handleAuditLog)
r.Get("/activity/events", s.handleAuditEvents)
r.Get("/users", s.handleListUsers)
r.Post("/users", s.handleCreateUser)
r.Patch("/users/{userID}", s.handleUpdateUser)
+141 -4
View File
@@ -5,13 +5,19 @@ import (
"database/sql"
"encoding/json"
"errors"
"strings"
"time"
)
type Activity struct {
ID string
ProjectID string
TaskID string
// ProjectName is filled by the instance-wide log, where a row without it says
// nothing: "renamed a section" needs to say which project's section.
ProjectName string
TaskID string
// UserID and UserName are empty when the account has been deleted. The record
// of what was done outlives whoever did it — see migration 0009.
UserID string
UserName string
Event string
@@ -19,6 +25,23 @@ type Activity struct {
CreatedAt time.Time
}
// AuditFilter narrows the instance-wide log. Zero values mean "do not filter".
type AuditFilter struct {
UserID string
ProjectID string
// Event matches exactly, e.g. "task.completed". The interface offers the set
// that actually occurs rather than a text field, so there is no prefix or
// wildcard to support here.
Event string
// Before pages backwards. Keyed on (created_at, id) rather than on created_at
// alone: the log is written in whole seconds, so a busy moment puts several
// rows on the same timestamp and a cursor that only knew the time would either
// skip them or repeat them.
BeforeAt int64
BeforeID string
Limit int
}
// RecordActivity appends to a project's history.
//
// Every mutation writes one, which is what makes the activity log complete rather
@@ -35,7 +58,7 @@ func (db *DB) RecordActivity(ctx context.Context, projectID, taskID, userID, eve
_, err := db.ExecContext(ctx,
`INSERT INTO activity (id, project_id, task_id, user_id, event, payload_json, created_at)
VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?)`,
NewID(), projectID, nullString(taskID), userID, event, encoded, time.Now().Unix())
NewID(), projectID, nullString(taskID), nullString(userID), event, encoded, time.Now().Unix())
return err
}
@@ -43,9 +66,12 @@ func (db *DB) ListActivity(ctx context.Context, projectID string, limit int) ([]
if limit <= 0 || limit > 200 {
limit = 50
}
// LEFT JOIN, not JOIN: a row whose author has been deleted still happened, and
// an inner join would drop it from the history silently.
rows, err := db.QueryContext(ctx, `
SELECT a.id, a.project_id, a.task_id, a.user_id, u.name, a.event, a.payload_json, a.created_at
FROM activity a JOIN users u ON u.id = a.user_id
SELECT a.id, a.project_id, a.task_id, COALESCE(a.user_id, ''), COALESCE(u.name, ''),
a.event, a.payload_json, a.created_at
FROM activity a LEFT JOIN users u ON u.id = a.user_id
WHERE a.project_id = ?
ORDER BY a.created_at DESC, a.id DESC
LIMIT ?`, projectID, limit)
@@ -72,6 +98,117 @@ func (db *DB) ListActivity(ctx context.Context, projectID string, limit int) ([]
return out, rows.Err()
}
// ListAuditLog is the same history read across the whole instance rather than one
// project at a time.
//
// The per-project log answers "what happened here", which is a question a project's
// members ask about their own work. This one answers "what has happened on this
// server", which only an administrator asks and which nothing in the API could
// answer before: ListActivity takes one project id, and an administrator is not
// necessarily a member of the project they need to look into.
//
// Reading is a keyset walk rather than an OFFSET. The log is append-heavy and read
// rarely, so a page fetched a minute after the one before it would otherwise be
// shifted by everything written in between — showing a row twice and skipping the
// one behind it, which is precisely the failure an audit log must not have.
func (db *DB) ListAuditLog(ctx context.Context, f AuditFilter) ([]Activity, error) {
limit := f.Limit
if limit <= 0 || limit > 500 {
limit = 100
}
where := []string{}
args := []any{}
if f.UserID != "" {
where = append(where, "a.user_id = ?")
args = append(args, f.UserID)
}
if f.ProjectID != "" {
where = append(where, "a.project_id = ?")
args = append(args, f.ProjectID)
}
if f.Event != "" {
where = append(where, "a.event = ?")
args = append(args, f.Event)
}
if f.BeforeAt > 0 {
// A row value, so the tie-break on id is part of the comparison rather
// than a second clause that would have to repeat the timestamp.
where = append(where, "(a.created_at, a.id) < (?, ?)")
args = append(args, f.BeforeAt, f.BeforeID)
}
clause := ""
if len(where) > 0 {
clause = "WHERE " + strings.Join(where, " AND ")
}
args = append(args, limit)
rows, err := db.QueryContext(ctx, `
SELECT a.id, a.project_id, p.name, a.task_id,
COALESCE(a.user_id, ''), COALESCE(u.name, ''),
a.event, a.payload_json, a.created_at
FROM activity a
JOIN projects p ON p.id = a.project_id
LEFT JOIN users u ON u.id = a.user_id
`+clause+`
ORDER BY a.created_at DESC, a.id DESC
LIMIT ?`, args...)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
defer rows.Close()
out := []Activity{}
for rows.Next() {
var a Activity
var taskID sql.NullString
var payload string
var created int64
if err := rows.Scan(&a.ID, &a.ProjectID, &a.ProjectName, &taskID, &a.UserID,
&a.UserName, &a.Event, &payload, &created); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
a.TaskID = taskID.String
a.CreatedAt = time.Unix(created, 0).UTC()
_ = json.Unmarshal([]byte(payload), &a.Payload)
out = append(out, a)
}
return out, rows.Err()
}
// AuditEvents is the set of event names the log actually contains, most frequent
// first, with how many of each.
//
// The filter offers these rather than a text field. Event names are an internal
// vocabulary — "member.role_changed", not a sentence anybody would guess — so a
// field to type them into is a field that returns nothing until you have read the
// source. The counts are worth having on their own: they are the shape of what the
// instance does.
func (db *DB) AuditEvents(ctx context.Context) ([]EventCount, error) {
rows, err := db.QueryContext(ctx, `
SELECT event, count(*) FROM activity
GROUP BY event ORDER BY count(*) DESC, event`)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
defer rows.Close()
out := []EventCount{}
for rows.Next() {
var e EventCount
if err := rows.Scan(&e.Event, &e.Count); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
out = append(out, e)
}
return out, rows.Err()
}
type EventCount struct {
Event string
Count int
}
// PurgeActivity drops history older than the retention window. An activity log that
// grows without limit turns a 10 MB database into a 2 GB one over a couple of years
// of ordinary use, on hardware that is somebody's spare machine.
@@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
-- `activity.user_id` stops cascading, and the log gets an index it can be read by.
--
-- Two changes with the same cause: there is now an instance-wide audit log, and
-- the table it reads was only ever built to answer "what happened in this
-- project".
--
-- The cascade first. An audit log whose rows disappear when the account they
-- describe is deleted answers "what has happened on this server" with everything
-- except the part somebody had a reason to remove. That is the wrong answer to the
-- question, and it is the same mistake migration 0008 fixed on `tasks.created_by`:
-- the record outlives the person. SET NULL, and the reader shows "en slettet
-- konto" rather than a name.
--
-- `project_id` keeps cascading on purpose. A project purged from the trash is
-- genuinely gone — the trash is the undo, and past it the deletion was deliberate
-- and complete. Activity has its own retention window besides.
--
-- Then the index. `idx_activity_project` leads with project_id, so a query that
-- wants the newest rows across every project cannot use it and scans the table to
-- sort it. The new one is ordered the way the audit log reads, and the compound
-- (created_at, id) matches the keyset the handler pages with — two rows written in
-- the same second must not be able to hide each other across a page boundary.
--
-- verdande:rebuild-tables
CREATE TABLE activity_rebuilt (
id TEXT PRIMARY KEY,
project_id TEXT NOT NULL REFERENCES projects (id) ON DELETE CASCADE,
task_id TEXT REFERENCES tasks (id) ON DELETE SET NULL,
-- Nullable: the record of what was done outlives whoever did it.
user_id TEXT REFERENCES users (id) ON DELETE SET NULL,
event TEXT NOT NULL,
payload_json TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT '{}',
created_at INTEGER NOT NULL
);
INSERT INTO activity_rebuilt (id, project_id, task_id, user_id, event, payload_json, created_at)
SELECT id, project_id, task_id, user_id, event, payload_json, created_at FROM activity;
DROP TABLE activity;
ALTER TABLE activity_rebuilt RENAME TO activity;
CREATE INDEX idx_activity_project ON activity (project_id, created_at DESC);
CREATE INDEX idx_activity_task ON activity (task_id) WHERE task_id IS NOT NULL;
CREATE INDEX idx_activity_recent ON activity (created_at DESC, id DESC);