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verdande/internal/store/secrets_test.go
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package store
import (
"context"
"encoding/json"
"path/filepath"
"strings"
"testing"
"github.com/kristianwind/verdande/internal/secret"
)
// The whole point of the exercise: what is written must not be readable in the
// file that a backup copies.
func TestATokenIsNotStoredInTheClear(t *testing.T) {
db, userID := sealedStore(t)
ctx := context.Background()
const token = "1//0-a-real-looking-refresh-token"
if err := db.SetUserSettings(ctx, userID, "gmail", map[string]any{
"refresh_token": token,
"label": "Verdande",
}); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
var raw string
if err := db.QueryRowContext(ctx,
`SELECT values_json FROM user_settings WHERE user_id = ?`, userID).Scan(&raw); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if strings.Contains(raw, token) {
t.Fatalf("the token is in the row as written: %s", raw)
}
// The rest stays readable, which is the reason for naming the secret fields
// rather than sealing the whole blob.
if !strings.Contains(raw, "Verdande") {
t.Errorf("the label was sealed too: %s", raw)
}
back, err := db.UserSettings(ctx, userID, "gmail")
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if back["refresh_token"] != token {
t.Errorf("got %q back", back["refresh_token"])
}
}
// The migration that matters. A row written before there was a key must still be
// readable, and must put itself away sealed the next time it is written — nobody
// should have to reconnect a mailbox because the server learned to encrypt.
func TestATokenWrittenBeforeTheKeyStillWorks(t *testing.T) {
db, userID := sealedStore(t)
ctx := context.Background()
const token = "1//0-written-when-there-was-no-key"
plain, _ := json.Marshal(map[string]any{"refresh_token": token})
if _, err := db.ExecContext(ctx, `
INSERT INTO user_settings (user_id, scope, values_json, updated_at)
VALUES (?, 'gmail', ?, 0)`, userID, string(plain)); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
values, err := db.UserSettings(ctx, userID, "gmail")
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("a row from before the key could not be read: %v", err)
}
if values["refresh_token"] != token {
t.Fatalf("got %q, want the plain token back", values["refresh_token"])
}
// Written back — and now sealed, without anything having asked for it.
if err := db.SetUserSettings(ctx, userID, "gmail", values); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
var raw string
if err := db.QueryRowContext(ctx,
`SELECT values_json FROM user_settings WHERE user_id = ?`, userID).Scan(&raw); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if strings.Contains(raw, token) {
t.Error("the row is still in the clear after being written back")
}
}
// The sweep finds people by the presence of a mailbox, so it must keep working
// now that the credential in it is ciphertext.
func TestTheSweepStillFindsAConnectedMailbox(t *testing.T) {
db, userID := sealedStore(t)
ctx := context.Background()
if err := db.SaveMailbox(ctx, &Mailbox{
UserID: userID, Kind: "gmail", RefreshToken: "1//0-token",
}); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
users, err := db.UsersWithMailboxes(ctx)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if len(users) != 1 {
t.Fatalf("the sweep found %d people with mailboxes, want 1", len(users))
}
}
func sealedStore(t *testing.T) (*DB, string) {
t.Helper()
db, err := Open(filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "test.db"))
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
t.Cleanup(func() { db.Close() })
box, err := secret.Open("", t.TempDir())
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
db.UseSecrets(box)
user := &User{Email: "kristian@example.dk", Name: "Kristian"}
if err := db.CreateUser(context.Background(), user, "Indbakke"); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
return db, user.ID
}